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ABSTRACT 
What is the role of Wahhabism in the rise of global terrorism?  Is Saudi Arabia 
and its Wahhabi ideology a contributing factor in the spread of violent radicalization in 
the Muslim world?  What are the possible causal mechanisms linking Wahhabism to 
violence?  How is it possible to ascertain these mechanisms and disentangle them from 
other sources of radicalization in the Muslim world?  Three potential hypotheses may 
provide answers to these questions: (1) Wahhabism provides passive ideological support 
for extremism, but is not a sufficient cause of violent radicalization, (2) Wahhabism 
provides indirect support through the establishment of networks that give material 
facilitation to extremist groups, and (3) Wahhabism provides direct support to extremists 
with the approval of the Saudi government.  The major finding of this study is that the 
first hypothesis—Wahhabism is a facilitator but not a direct contributor to violent 
extremism—is best supported by the evidence.  Those who claim that Wahhabism has 
nothing to do with terrorism underestimate the extent to which the core principles of 
Wahhabism overlap with the extremist ideology of takfir, and its inherent intolerance 
toward other creeds can create fertile minds ready to demonize foreigners and even 
fellow Muslims who are non-Wahhabists.  The second hypothesis receives hardly any 
evidential support, while the third hypothesis has no support at all and amounts to guilt 
by association. 
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Saudi Arabia and the United States (U.S.) have had a long-standing political, 
economic and military alliance in the Middle East since the early 1930s.  The U.S. has 
demonstrated through various military deployments and informal agreements that it is 
committed to the security of Saudi Arabia.  America’s foreign policy, since the early 
1930s, has supported and protected the Saudi ruling family and refrained from criticizing 
the monarchy's domestic policies and human rights record.1  This is in spite of the fact 
that Saudi Arabia is a country that has been governed since its founding by both an 
Islamic fundamentalist religious ideology, Wahhabism, and a repressive authoritarian 
monarchy.2  Many scholars have accused this ideology of “deviat[ing] from [Islam’s] 
core notions of tolerance, pragmatism, and moderation.”3  This has primarily been made 
possible by the vast oil wealth (or Petrodollars) and purchasing power that is at Saudi 
Arabia’s disposal, giving the monarchy the ability to form such a strong friendship with 
the U.S. and other liberal and conservative governments.  
The events that transpired on September 11, 2001, shook the foundation of the 
U.S.-Saudi relationship by raising serious concerns and questions regarding the role of 
the Saudi government and their Wahhabi ideology played in terrorism associated with Al-
Qaeda.  The attacks shined a light on Saudi Arabia since 15 out of 19 hijackers as well as 
Osama bin Laden and many of the global ”jihadists” that participated in the conflicts 
fought in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq were Saudi nationals.  This naturally 
lead the U.S. government and its people to ask serious questions as to what is wrong with 
Saudi Arabia and to draw conclusions about its religious ideology and institutions.  
Wahhabism generates a great deal of debate among academic and policy experts.  Some 
insist it is central to the growth of Islamist violence and jihadism; others insist it is a rigid  
 
                                                 
1 As’ad Abu Khalil, The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power (New 
York: Seven Stories Press, 2004), 19. 
2 Ibid., 20. 
3 Ibid., 21. 
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ideology with illiberal beliefs, but not directly linked to violence and jihadism.  Still 
others take a middle of the road position in which they say that Wahhabism is a 
contributing factor, but not the sole factor in violent Islamist extremism.   
This thesis seeks to grapple with these issues and endeavors to answer the 
following questions to determine the role played by the Saudi government and the 
Wahhabis in the rise of global terrorism.  First, is Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi ideology a 
contributing factor in the spread of violent radicalization in the Muslim world?  Second, 
what are the possible causal mechanisms linking Wahhabism to violence?  Finally, how 
is it possible to ascertain these mechanisms and disentangle them from other sources of 
radicalization in the Muslim world? 
This topic is important to pursue because the U.S. has entered into its eighth year 
of fighting terrorism in the campaign formerly referred to as the “Global War on Terror” 
and the results thus far have not been favorable in deterring terrorist acts or the spread of 
its influence.  Many government and academic specialists are saying that this war is not 
just about fighting terrorists, denying them safe haven, and bringing them to justice.  It 
must also entail dealing with the social, political, and ideological root causes of Muslim 
radicalization.  Some scholars assert that the radical religious ideology promoted by 
Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabi clerical establishment is the cause of terrorism.  Yet, these 
assertions require serious reflections and validation.  It is easy to draw a correlation 
between Wahhabism and violence, but correlation is not causation.  This thesis seeks to 
think through how Wahhabism might contribute to violence and what the limits are for 
blaming Wahhabism for the current threat from Al-Qaeda. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review provides a survey of the leading opinions of 
researchers in the field concerning Middle Eastern studies, specifically concerning Saudi 
Arabia and Wahhabism.  This review presents the anti-Wahhabi opinions of Hamid Algar, 
Khaled Abou El Fadl, the International Crisis Group and Christopher Blanchard and, on 
the other hand, the defender’s opinions of Natana J. DeLong-Bas and David Commins. 
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Hamid Algar, in Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, identifies two ways to distinguish 
the Salafi from the Wahhabi: “a reliance on attempts at persuasion rather than coercion in 
order to rally other Muslims to their cause; and an informed awareness of the political 
and socio-economic crisis confronting the Muslim world.” 4   The remainder of his 
comparison of the two ideologies highlights their similarities.  The Salafi and the 
Wahhabi share a disdain for all developments subsequent to the al-Salaf al-Salih (the 
righteous ancestors), rejection of Sufism and dismissal of adherence to one of the Sunni 
madhhabs (a school of Islamic jurisprudence).5  He emphasizes the strong influence of 
the Saudi petrodollar in the propagation of Wahhabism, but also attributes the political 
situation of the Arab world at the time as a contributing factor that led to the co-opting of 
Salafism.  He asserts that the threat presented by Jamal Abd al-Nasir, required the Saudi 
government to develop a three-front strategy to ensure the survival of Wahhabism.  The 
ideological front was the most important in the co-opting of the Salafis through the 
establishment of the Muslim World League.  It was through this organization that the 
melding of Wahhabi and Salafi ideologies occurred.6  This organization created a means 
for establishing “Islamic solidarity” through the spread of Wahhabism, for the Saudi 
government, at the “expense of local Islamic traditions.”7 
Khaled Abou El Fadl, in The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, 
builds on the conclusions made in Algar’s work and expresses the opinion that 
Wahhabism would not have been able to spread in the modern Muslim world under its 
own banner.  For this to occur, it would have to be spread under the banner of Salafism.8  
This attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was needed as Salafism was a much more 
“credible paradigm in Islam;” making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism.9  This was 
                                                 
4 Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002), 
47. 
5 Ibid., 47–48. 
6 Ibid., 49–49. 
7 Ibid,  50. 
8 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 2007), 74. 
9 Ibid. 
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made possible based on the assertion that “Wahhabism was not a school of thought in 
Islam, but Islam itself, and it is the only possible Islam.”10  This rejection made many of 
the Wahhabi doctrines and methodologies transferable to Salafism.  As a result, the 
methodology and substance of Salafism is nearly identical to Wahhabism, with the 
exception that Salafism was initially much more tolerant of diversity and differing 
opinions.11  The co-opting of Salafism by Wahhabism was not completed until the 1970s 
when the Wahhabis stripped away some of their extreme intolerance and co-opted the 
symbolism and language of Salafism; making them practically indistinguishable.   
The Wahhabi and Salafi shared three major points of ideological similarities that 
made this co-opting possible.  First, both shared the belief in a golden age within Islam 
(traditionally dated from the seventh to thirteenth centuries Common Era or C.E.), which 
fosters the belief that this utopia envisioned by the golden age was retrievable and 
reproducible in contemporary Islam.  Second, both dismissed critical historical inquiries 
and retreating to the text was their answer to the challenges presented by modernity.12  
Finally, both “advocated a form of egalitarianism and anti-elitism to the point that they 
came to consider intellectualism and rational moral insight to be inaccessible, and thus 
corruptions to the purity of Islam.”13  This unification of Wahhabism and Salafism is the 
basis of the modern puritanical movement. 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Saudi government began to organize a 
campaign of spreading Wahhabi ideology throughout both the Muslim and non-Muslim 
worlds.  “Saudi Arabia had created a complex worldwide system of financial incentives 
that amply rewarded those who advocated…Wahhabism.”14 
This newfound patronage with the contemporary Salafis, under Wahhabi 
influence, created a Bedouin Islam that had become widespread and influential in the 
                                                 
10 Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, 74. 
11 Ibid., 75. 
12 Ibid., 79. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 87. 
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development of the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds.15  With this new bankroll, it is 
doubtful that any attempt to stem the spread of this new movement would have been 
impossible.16  This melding of Salafism and Wahhabism gave rise to the “vigorous, 
potent and at times lethal puritan movement.”17   
The opposition to the arguments expressed above comes mostly from Natana J. 
DeLong-Bas, in Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, that the 
ideologies of Wahhabism, Salafism and Jihadism may appear to be manifestations of the 
same phenomenon.  However, closer examination reveals a number of deviations in their 
ideological approaches.18  Wahhabis reflected an ideology with the central tenant of faith 
focused on absolute monotheism.19  Salafism reflected an ideology with the central tenant 
focusing on the political aspects of tawhid (concept of monotheism in Islam).20  She 
argues that there is no linear trajectory between Wahhabism and Salafism based on 
tawhid.  This is because Wahhabism wants to reunite Muslims under the concept of a 
monotheistic belief, where as Salafism exercises the political position of establishing the 
caliphate, without first attaining monotheism.21  Salafism is further broken into three 
distinct groups as a result of their interpretation of the tawhid. 
The first group focuses on education and missionary work to solidify the tawhid 
prior to any political movement, which share similarities with Wahhabism.  The second 
group focuses on the concept of the establishment of a caliphate through the means of 
evolution, not revolution.  This group criticizes the policies of current regimes. However, 
it does not advocate the use of military action to implement the caliphate and Sharia 
law.22  The third group, the Jihadists, share similar political goals with the second group.  
                                                 
15 Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, 91. 
16 Ibid., 93. 
17 Ibid., 94. 
18 Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (London: 
Oxford University Press, Inc., 2004), 292. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 293. 
21 Ibid., 295. 
22 DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, 295. 
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However, unlike the second group, they advocate the use of violence to attain their 
goals.23  Therefore, Jihadism was considered an offshoot of Salafism, not Wahhabism, 
with their main focus of concern on the “exercise of jihad as military engagements in the 
defense of Muslims worldwide.”24 
David Commins, in The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, supports DeLong-
Bas’s arguments that the jihadist culture is more based in Salafism than Wahhabism.  He 
believes that “the ideology of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda is not Wahhabi. It is 
instead a part of contemporary jihadist tendency that evolved from the teachings of 
Sayyid Qutb…in other words; Al-Qaeda belongs to an offshoot of twenty-first century 
Muslim revivalist ideology, not Wahhabism.”25  He argues that Al-Qaeda contradicts 
Wahhabi doctrine on two vital points.  First, he claims that Al-Qaeda’s calling for the 
overthrow of the Saudi monarchy contradicts both the practice and doctrine of the 
Wahhabis.  Second, he claims that the call for global jihad against the West made by Al-
Qaeda is illegitimate as Wahhabi doctrine declares only a sovereign can declare jihad.26  
He agrees with DeLong-Bas’s conclusions that Al-Qaeda’s ideology evolved with the 
introduction of Salafi ideas from Sayyid Qutb and other Muslim Brotherhood members.27 
Christopher Blanchard, in “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” 
expresses the opinion that advocacy of jihad is a relatively new phenomenon and remains 
highly disputed by both the Wahhabi and Salafi communities.  He claims that the jihadist 
(or militant) culture lies more in the ideology of the Salafi community despite the 
Wahhabi clerics and converts participation in the advocacy of jihad and their 
participation in the jihadist movement.  However, he does recognize that some Muslims 
do consider Wahhabism as Saudi Arabia’s version of Salafism.28  He argues that violent 
                                                 
23 DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, 296. 
24 Ibid., 293. 
25 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 
2006), 185. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 185–186. 
28 Christopher M. Blanchard, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” Congressional 
Research Service Report to Congress RS21695 (January 24, 2008): 3–4. 
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Salafi groups like Al-Qaeda call for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and the 
“establishment of states that will sustain puritanical Islamic doctrine enforced under strict 
application of Islamic law.”29  He does acknowledge that the Saudis in Afghanistan 
established and funded the radical beliefs spread rapidly through mosques and madrasas.  
He argues that it is widely acknowledged that the Saudi government and its effluent 
citizens have supported the spread of Wahhabism throughout the Muslim and non-
Muslim worlds and that this has been attributed by some scholars as what promoted 
terrorism and the spread of a violent jihadist culture.  He links Saudi Arabia and Al-
Qaeda through this funding of mosques, madrasas and charities used to modify the 
Wahhabi ideology to meet Al-Qaeda’s political needs and to solicit Saudi patronage.     
The International Crisis Group (ICG), in the “Saudi Backgrounder: Who are the 
Islamists?,” presented the argument that four different groups have evolved from Saudi 
Islamism.  The fourth group, the jihadist, developed out of this Saudi Islamism, which 
refutes DeLong-Bas’s argument that only the Salafi movement spawned the jihadist 
culture.  ICG traces the roots of this jihadist culture back to the Saudi regime’s active 
encouragement of its citizens to participate in the Soviet-Afghan war.30  The Wahhabi 
religious establishment also strongly supported this encouragement, which stated “it is a 
collective duty for Muslims to fight in Afghanistan.”31  Encouragement also came from 
the U.S. as it supported the Cold War policies of communist containment.  By the 
conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan war, many Saudi youths were leaving Saudi Arabia in 
search of military and combat experience, especially once Al-Qaeda established its 
training camps in Afghanistan, creating a link between Saudi Arabia and the global 
jihadist movement of Al-Qaeda.32 
Thomas Hegghammer, in “Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi 
Arabia,” outlines the complexity concerning the links between Saudi Arabia and Al-
                                                 
29 Blanchard, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” 4. 
30 International Crisis Group, “Saudi Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?” Middle East Report 31 
(September 21, 2004): 3. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 4. 
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Qaeda.  He argues that Saudi Arabia is considered the heartland of Al-Qaeda due to the 
regime’s contribution of money, recruits and ideology to the global jihad.  However, he 
notes that the strength of the support given was more for the classic jihadist struggles, 
such as Bosnia and Chechnya, and most Saudi Islamists disapproved of Al-Qaeda’s 
activities on the Arabian Peninsula.  Based on this view, Bin Laden shifted his attention 
away from the Arabian Peninsula and focused on the United States.  This move proved 
beneficial to the global jihadist movement as it resulted in Saudi Arabia becoming an 
important support base for Al-Qaeda in the form of financial contributions, recruits and 
clerical opinions.33 
The arguments above both draw the conclusion that a violent jihadist movement 
has developed in the Muslim world; however, there are differing opinions on how that 
movement transpired.  The anti-Wahhabi advocates, Algar and Abou El Fadl, argue that 
Wahhabism co-opted Salafism and that this co-opting brought the jihadist ideology into 
the current puritanical movement.  The defenders, De-Long-Bas and Commins, argue 
there is no direct link to the jihadist ideology from Wahhabism as it has developed out of 
a stricter interpretation of Salafism.  The ICG report would challenge that opinion as it 
links the jihadist movement as one of the four strains that developed in Wahhabism and 
links it with Al-Qaeda’s growth in Afghanistan.  Hegghammer acknowledges the 
influence that Saudi Arabia has played in the spread of this jihadist culture and the 
support given to Al-Qaeda through Saudi patronage.   
The analysis of all of the arguments is sound in their individual perspectives of 
the development of the jihadist ideology and how that culture might have influenced Al-
Qaeda’s ideology and growth.  This thesis attempts to evaluate the empirical basis of 
these claims and make a determination on which view is closer to reality, to determine 
which ideology had the greatest influence on Al-Qaeda’s ideology and the role that the 
Saudi government played in the spread of the jihadist movement.  This allows for the 
proper interpretation of implications for the Saudi government and determining future 
U.S.-Saudi agreements. 
                                                 
33 Thomas Hegghammer, “Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia,” International 
Affairs 84:4 (2008): 707–709. 
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Three potential hypotheses can be researched to provide an answer to the major 
research questions.  
 Hypothesis 1-Wahhabism provides Passive Support:  The roots of this 
ideology are rigid precepts that demonize others and promote intolerance 
toward non-Wahhabi Muslims and non-Muslims.  It also sanctions 
violence normally prohibited by other strands of Islam. Saudi government 
encourages this ideology, spreads it through the media and educational 
system, and does not suppress ardent promoters.  This hypothesis, if valid, 
means that Wahhabism is not a sufficient cause of violent radicalization, 
but a contributing factor along with other intervening variables.   
 Hypothesis 2-Wahhabism provides Indirect Support:  The Saudi 
government and clerical establishment provide financial support to 
religious, charitable, and educational institutions worldwide known to 
have produced militants or facilitated terrorism either through ideological 
indoctrination, recruitment, or financial assistance.   
 Hypothesis 3-Wahhabism provides Direct Support:  The Saudi 
government and the Wahhabi clerical establishment directly support 
violent radicalization through facilitation of recruitment, provision of 
financial resources to militants, giving intelligence support, providing a 
safe haven, or/and providing fatwas (religious rulings) at the highest level 
permitting acts of violence. 
B. METHODS AND SOURCES 
It is necessary to engage in an historical and contemporary analysis to test each of 
the hypotheses that emerge from the literature on Wahhabism.  The historical analysis 
focuses on Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, the theology and ideology that he created 
and the violent influence of that ideology in the formation of the modern Saudi state.  
This historical analysis provides the necessary background and foundation for 
understanding the subsequent chapters. 
The contemporary analysis focuses on three time periods and assesses each of the 
three hypotheses in each time period to substantiate which of the hypotheses are the most 
valid.  The first time period is from 1979 to 1989, when the Saudi regime and its clerical 
establishment supported the jihad in Afghanistan.  The second time period is from 1992 
to 2001, when there were major conflicts and insurgencies in Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria, 
Egypt and Tajikistan in which the Saudis have been involved.  The final time period is 
from 2001 to 2007, which addresses the current insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
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the terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia.  Each time period is evaluated for evidence of 
passive, indirect and direct support and also attempts to assess at which level this support 
was coming from the Saudi government and its state institutions, Saudi sub-state actors 
such as the Wahhabi clerics, or Saudi citizens.   
The goal of this analysis is to engage in tracing the process by which Wahhabism 
might have contributed, directly or indirectly, to violent extremism.  Process tracing will 
help determine if the connection between Wahhabism and violent extremism is 
ideological (i.e., merely inspiring people to act violently with material support), 
institutional (i.e., supported by formal Wahhabi networks and the Saudi state), or 
coincidental (i.e., no evidence exists to suggest a sustained pattern of Wahhabi direct or 
indirect support for violent jihadism). 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The first chapter outlines the history of the origins of Wahhabism.  It provides 
background information on Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, the theology and ideology 
of his teachings and the role his ideology played in the formation of the three Saudi states.   
The second chapter presents an analysis of the three major Islamic ideologies, 
Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism.  It breakdowns each of the ideologies, addresses the 
internal differences that have resulted in splitting into sub-groups or sects and attempts to 
determine the role that Wahhabism might have played in the development of the ideology 
practiced by those associated with the global jihad.  
The third chapter examines how the Saudi monarchy has utilized its Wahhabi 
ideology in the exportation of jihad, especially to places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and 
Chechnya.  Second, it discusses the role Wahhabism has played in Saudi law and 
education.  Finally, it evaluates the various opinions concerning Saudi Arabia’s possible 
links to the terrorist group, al-Qaeda. 
The major finding of this study is that the first hypothesis—Wahhabism is a 
facilitator but not a direct contributor to violent extremism—is best supported by the 
evidence.  Those who claim that Wahhabism has nothing to do with terrorism 
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underestimate the extent to which the core principles of Wahhabism overlap with the 
extremist ideology of takfir, and its inherent intolerance toward other creeds can create 
fertile minds ready to demonize foreigners and even fellow Muslims who are non-
Wahhabists.  The second hypothesis receives hardly any evidential support, while the 
third hypothesis has no support at all and amounts to guilt by association. 
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II. THE ORIGINS OF WAHHABISM AND THE SAUDI STATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Saudi Arabia has significant religious ties to Islam as it is the birthplace of the 
Prophet Muhammad and home to Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina.  The 
significance of these ties is that they have been used, since the establishment of the 
modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (also referred to as Saudi State or Saudi-Wahhabi 
state) in 1932, as a means of legitimizing the Saudi monarchy’s power internally and 
externally in Islamic terms.  The intertwining of Saudi political/military power and 
Wahhabi religious power strengthened this legitimacy, as Wahhabism (or Wahhabiyyah) 
claims to represent the only orthopraxy Islam.34   
Wahhabism was founded in the eighteenth century as “an Islamic puritanical 
doctrine of reform and renewal attributed to Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who allied 
himself with the House of Saud in 1744.”35  Wahhabism has since become the official 
ideology of the state or kingdom with the Qur’an serving as its constitution.36  It is 
important to understand the origins of this ideology and its historic link with Saudi 
Arabia to access the events in modern times accurately.  This chapter explores the origins 
of Wahhabism and the role it has played in the development of the Saudi state.   
B. MUHAMMAD IBN ABD AL-WAHHAB (1703–1892) 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in the region of Najd in Al-Uyaynah in 
1703, which is a region not known for its religious scholarship.  He was a member of the 
Banu Tamim tribe of that region and is said to have lived in poverty.37  His father was a 
local judge associated with the Hanbali School of jurisprudence, which was one of the 
four Sunni schools of jurisprudence and known for its conservativeness and strict 
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interpretations of Islam.38  He is said to have travelled to places such as Hijaz, Asha’ and 
Basrah,39 where he received his training in law, theology and Sufism in the holy cities of 
Mecca and Medina. He studied under scholars of the Hanbali School, the strictest of the 
Sunni schools of jurisprudence. 40   It was during his time in Media where he was 
introduced to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328), a famous scholar who fought 
against the crusaders and believed that the foundation of Islam were the Qur’an and the 
sword.  These teachings would greatly influence Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s development of 
his ideology and it would be said that he took these teachings to their extreme.41   
Ibn Taymiyyah was uncompromising of the Sufis, believing them to be pagans 
and infidels,42 but never rejecting their beliefs entirely;43 similarly, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
rejected specifically the Sufis that practiced saint veneration.  Ibn Taymiyyah also did not 
allow for ideology, by forbidding Muslims from making requests at the tombs of holy 
people, which even included the Prophet’s tomb, yet another trend seen in Wahhabism.  
The Wahhabi doctrine of anti-Shia can be linked to the influences of the Hanbali School 
of jurisprudence, out of which Ibn Taymiyyah is one venerated scholar.  All other Sunni 
schools of jurisprudence, not just Wahhabism, have anti-Shia views, but Wahhabism 
seems to be most vocal about it. 
With his Hanbali training influenced by the ideals of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab set out to Basrah with the intention of educating the Shia in the correct path of 
God.  He was not well received by the Shia and was forcibly expelled from Basrah.  His 
experience in Basrah shocked him and would be the motivation behind his anti-Shia 
campaign he pursued for the remainder of his life.  His actions in Basrah did not only 
alienate him from the Shia, but also from his father and brother Sulayman.44  His father 
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was removed from his position as a judge in Al-Uyaynah and forced to relocate to 
Huraymilah as punishment for Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s actions.45  This event might have 
been the motivation for Sulayman to become so openly critical of his brother’s new 
ideological teachings.  Sulayman called into question the legitimacy of his brother’s 
teachings by stating, “[Ibn Abd al-Wahhab] did not concern himself with reading or 
understanding the works of juristic predecessors.” 46   “Ibn Abd al-Wahhab while 
prohibiting taqlid [as far as it related to jurists to whom he did not agree], [he] ended up 
affirming and even maintaining it, but in a different form” creating a double standard that 
prohibited the taqlid of the other Sunni schools of jurisprudence, but allowing for his 
own.47  Even with this rejection from his family, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was not deterred 
from spreading his new ideological beliefs. 
After his father’s death in 1740, he would return to the town of his birth where it 
is believed that he realized “words are not sufficient.”48  Ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed 
that Muslim society had reverted to the period of pre-Islamic Arabia, the jahiliyya (period 
of ignorance).  A conclusion reached based on his time in the holy cities, and his travels 
to the cities of Basrah and Al-Uyaynah where he witnessed the venation of saints and 
construction of tombs and shrines of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.  These 
were acts that he considered to be “pagan superstitions and idolatry, which is the worse of 
sins in Islam…denouncing these beliefs and practices as unwarranted innovations”49  He 
ordered the destruction of all tombs, mosques built over tombs that venerated anyone 
other than God destroyed, but this is not what would give Ibn Abd al-Wahhab his fame.  
That would come from the public execution by stoning of a young woman who allegedly 
confessed to adultery.  This event gained so much attention that it almost caused revolts 
in Ahsa’ and led the local ruler to issue an order that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab be killed.   
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These events would force Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to flee to Dir’iyyah and place him on a 
collision course with his future ally, Muhammad Ibn Saud, addressed later in the 
chapter.50 
C. MOTIVATIONS FOR A NEW THEOLOGY 
Armed with his Hanbali teachings and his experiences from his travels, Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab was convinced that Muslim society had reverted to the period of pre-Islamic 
Arabia, or the jahiliyya (period of ignorance).  He witnessed Muslims revering saints and 
constructing tombs and shrines in honor of the Prophet Muhammad and the companions 
in the holiest of Muslim cities (Mecca and Medina).  He considered these acts to be 
“pagan superstitions and idolatry, which is the worse of sins in Islam…denouncing these 
beliefs and practices as unwarranted innovations.” 51   These beliefs and practices, 
according to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, “compromised the unity of God (Islam’s radical or 
absolute monotheism) and the Islamic community, as [made] evident by the eruption of 
tribalism and tribal warfare that had returned to Arabia.” 52   What made this 
compromising of God’s unity even more reprehensible to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was that it 
was occurring in the “Islamic heartland and homeland of the Prophet.”53  He believed 
that these actions weakened the umma (community) leading to the moral decay of Islamic 
society.  Ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed these were deviations from the true path, which 
became the motivation for his theology based on tawhid (which is explained in the 
following chapter) and his mission to return all Muslims to the “true” path of Islam. 
Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, with the aid of his ally Ibn Saud, set forth on a quest to “rid 
Islam of all of the corruptions that he believed had crept into the religion; …mysticism, 
the doctrine of intercession, rationalism, and Shi’ism as well as many other practices that 
he considered heretical innovations.”54   He believed that all Muslims needed to return to 
the normative period, which was the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions 
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or simply the first two centuries of Islam.  “The Islamic way of life was to be found in its 
pure, unadulterated form of seventh-century community.”55  He called for ijtihad, which 
required that all post-Prophetic developments and the time-honored interpretations of 
both the ulama and the schools of jurisprudence be reviewed in the light of this period 
utilizing only the Qur’an and Sunna for guidance.56  That quest would be in the form of 
jihad against Muslims and non-Muslims equally.  He justified his war against Muslims as 
not only permissible, but an as obligation as any Muslims not following his teachings 
were mushrikin (polytheists) and that the Qur’an was clear that such a sin against Islam 
was unforgivable.57  Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s quest of jihad would begin with his arrival in 
Dir’iyyah. 
D. THE FIRST SAUDI STATE (1744–1818) 
With the growing level of threats against his life, including at least one failed 
assassination attempt, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab decided that to continue the spread of his 
ideology, he would need to leave the town of his birth and make his way to Dir’iyyah, a 
small market town in Najd ruled by Muhammad Ibn Saud.  Ibn Saud expressed initial 
reservations about meeting with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, but was convinced by his wife to 
take the risk.58  She told him, “This man was led toward us by Allah, and he is a great 
find, so take advantage of what Allah has made exclusively yours.”59  Therefore, the two 
men met in 1744 and struck an alliance that would shape what today is known as the 
Saudi Kingdom.  This section shows how the alliance developed and how it benefited 
both parties in the accomplishment of their goals. 
Dir’iyyah was a small abode of merchants, farmers, artisans, minor ulama 
(religious scholars) and slaves ruled by a member of the Ibn Saud family since 1727.  The 
settlement had accepted the rule of the Saudi emirs due to their vast land and water 
holdings around the settlement and their ability to defend it against raids from other emirs 
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and tribal confederations.  The Saudis executed a traditional form of rule in Dir’iyyah, 
but their power to project influence outside of the settlement was extremely limited.  This 
inability to project power can be attributed to its shortcomings.60   First, the Saudis 
“lacked an identifiable tribal origin that would have granted them a strong association 
with a tribal confederation.”61  Second, the Saudis lacked a sufficient surplus of wealth 
because their commercial interests did not yield sufficient returns that would give them 
the power to project their authority beyond the settlement.  Ibn Abd al-Wahhab would aid 
Ibn Saud in developing the necessary wealth required to expand Saudi influence through 
the collection of the zakat (Islamic tax paid to a community’s ruler). 62   With this 
assurance of zakat, Ibn Saud agreed to the alliance with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. 
The alliance would provide Ibn Saud an alternative source of legitimacy through 
the adoption of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s religious ideology and zakat, giving him the ability 
to overcome previous shortcoming and assume political control of the Muslim 
community.  Ibn Abd al-Wahhab would be guaranteed control over all religious 
interpretations and the ability to wage his jihad against those who opposed his teachings, 
and the authority of Ibn Saud.  This alliance provided the Saudis with the force 
(Wahhabism) necessary to expand their rule and promised the benefits of political and 
religious power that would be essential to conquering Arabian Peninsula.63  It is unlikely 
that either man would have been successful in their ambitions without this alliance.   
The Saudi-Wahhabi alliance began with a recruitment campaign endorsed by the 
sedentary (settlement) populations of southern Najd, as it was necessary to raise a 
fighting force capable of executing the jihad and spreading Wahhabism.  Some of the 
settlements willingly accepted the rule of the new Saudi-Wahhabi emir; while others 
accepted out of shear fear, and those that resisted, were subjected to raids and elimination.  
These newly acquired populations were required to swear an oath of allegiance to the 
emir, demonstrate their loyalty by fighting in the jihad and pay the required zakat.  The 
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success of the expansion rested on the Saudi-Wahhabi emir’s ability to subjugate the 
sedentary and the nomadic populations of Najd under the tenets of Wahhabism.  The 
subjugation of the settlements proved to be relatively easy to maintain control over; 
however, the nomadic (tribal) populations proved to be a much more troublesome 
endeavor as the tribes’ mobility allowed them to remain autonomous.  However, once 
they joined the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance, they proved to be an invaluable fighting force 
necessary for continued expansion.64  The Saudi-Wahhabi alliance was able to achieve 
the allegiance of these two populations through Wahhabism.  “It seems that Wahhabism 
achieved the ultimate religious symbiosis between the nomads and the sedentary 
population by combining an uncompromising Unitarian and puritanical Islam with an 
obsession with ritual specialization and fiqh, those responding to the needs of both 
[populations].”65     
With this newly acquired fighting force and under the leadership of Ibn Saud’s 
son, Abd al-Aziz, the alliance would annex Riyadh, Kharj and Qasim by 1792.  The 
newly conquered settlements would receive Wahhabi judges as representatives of their 
new rulers, but the Saudis allowed the local emirs to remain in power as long as they paid 
the zakat as a token of their submission.  With both central and southern Arabia now 
under Saudi control, their sights turned towards Hasa, which had a large Shia population 
seen by Wahhabis as ahl al-bid‘a (innovators).  By 1797, Hasa, Qatif, Qatar and Bahrain 
had either been completely subjected or agreed to pay the zakat to the Saudis.  The 
Saudis now turned their attention toward the Hijaz, which was part of the Ottoman 
Empire and contained the two holiest Islamic cities.  The Saudi-Wahhabi forces were 
able to overcome the strong resistance, and by 1804, had established Saudi control over 
the Hijaz and Asir.  Also, during the conquest of the Hijaz, the Saudis began raids into 
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massacre of the Shia inhabitants resulting in the assassination of Abd al-Aziz in 1803, by 
a Shi’a as revenge for Karbala.  The Saudis did attempt to expand into Yemen and Syria, 
but all attempts were met with heavy resistance and failure.66  
Madawi al-Rasheed provides four factors that facilitated the Saudi-Wahhabi 
expansion.  First, the fragmented society that existed in Najd allowed the Saudis only to 
have to contend with one enemy at a time making it easy to defeat them.  Second, 
divisions within the various settlements ruling establishment weakened their overall 
resistance and provided the Saudis with allies in their enemy’s camps.  Third, the 
migration of some of the more powerful tribes to Syria and Iraq weakened the fighting 
capabilities of the resistors.  Finally, the peaceful acceptance of Wahhabism by the 
sedentary populations in Najd provided support for this ideology to grow before a 
military campaign even began.67 
The vast new Saudi state was short-lived; for the expansion created vast 
fluctuating bounties with nothing more than raids as a mechanism to maintain order.  
Raids had proven an effective technique in explaining the Saudi state, but would 
ultimately provoke the Ottoman Empire to dispatch forces in 1811, under the command 
of Muhammad Ali’s son, Ibrahim Pasha.  The Saudis were no match for the Ottoman 
forces and surrendered on September 11, 1818, after the Dir’iyyah’s defenses had been 
completely destroyed.  Members of the Wahhabi ulama and the Saudi emir, Abdullah, 
were executed by order of the Ottoman Sultan.  This marked the end of the First Saudi 
State and it would be six years before Saudi-Wahhabi authority would rise to power again.   
E. THE SECOND SAUDI STATE (1824–1891) 
The removal of Ottoman forces in 1824 from Najd marked the opportunity the 
Saudi-Wahhabi alliance needed to reassert its control over the region.  Turki Ibn 
Abdullah, the son of former Saudi ruler, Abdullah, would accomplish this task.  He 
would capture Riyadh, Arid, Kharj, Mahmal, Sudayr and Aflaj with forces he was able to 
muster in the areas surrounding Riyadh. By 1830, he was able to assert authority over 
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Hasa, but had minimal control over Ha’il and Qasim.  He did restrict his campaigns, even 
though he was a strict Wahhabi imam, to avoid poking the Ottoman forces that remained 
in the Hijaz.  However, the Ottoman forces would prove to be the least of Turki’s 
problems, because by 1831, internal divisions within his own family began to challenge 
his authority.  Turki was assassinated in 1834, by his cousin, Mishari, who was 
subsequently killed by Turki’s son, Faysal, who assumed the position of imam.68 
Faysal’s first reign would be short lived.  By 1837, his refusal to pay tribute to the 
Ottoman forces in Hijaz provoked them to march on Riyadh.  Faysal was captured and 
imprisoned in Cairo.  Khalid, a member of the Saudi family, was appointed to rule 
southern Najd by the Ottomans, but another member of the Saudi family, Abdullah Ibn 
Thunayan, overthrew him.  The political instability continued when Faysal escaped from 
Cairo in 1843, and killed Ibn Thunayan to begin his second reign over the Saudi state.  
Upon Faysal’s death in 1865, his son, Abdullah, would become ruler.  However, 
Abdullah would also be challenged by his two brothers, which would result in various 
confederations taking advantage of the division within the Saudi family to regain their 
independence.  This struggle between brothers would not be resolved allowing the ruler 
of Ha’il the opportunity to seize Riyadh and assume control over the Saudi state.  The 
Saudis attempted to regain control, but failed to achieve victory over the Rashidi emirate 
and were exiled to Kuwait in 1893.69  Unlike the First Saudi State that fell due to the 
defeat at the hands of the Ottoman forces, the Second Saudi State’s collapse can be 
attributed to the internal fragmentation caused by the political struggle.  This internal 
conflict weakened the power of the Saudis allowing the state to be conquered by a rival 
Najd emirate bringing an end to the Second Saudi State and the presence of Saudi 
authority on the Arabian Peninsula for nine years. 
F. THE RISE OF THE THIRD SAUDI STATE (1902–1932) 
Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Saud (known as Ibn Saud) executed military 
campaigns with the assistance of the mutawwa’a (religious specialists) and the Ikhwan 
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(tribal military force) to restore Saudi authority to the Arabian Peninsula and laying the 
foundation for the creation of the Third (or modern) Saudi State.  It began in Kuwait in 
1902, when Ibn Saud recruited only sixty men and launched a surprise attack on Riyadh.  
The surprise raid was successful and Ibn Saud was appointed ruler of Riyadh.  From 
Riyadh, Ibn Saud began a series of campaigns to regain former Saudi territories in 
southern Najd pushing the Rashidis forces into Qasim.  The battle between the Saudis 
and Rashidis would be fought in Qasim for four years (1902–1906).  The Ottoman 
Empire provided the Rashidis with arms and supplies to oppose Ibn Saud; however, the 
Ottoman’s involvement allowed Ibn Saud to secure an alliance with Kuwait, and 
ultimately, the British.  By 1906, Ibn Saud had successfully defeated the Rashidis and the 
Ottoman conferred upon him the de facto title of ruler of Qasim and Najd.70  With Qasim 
and Najd firmly under Saudi control, Ibn Saud turned his attention to the conquest of 
Hasa.  The Ottomans had approximately 1,200 troops stationed in Hafuf, but Ibn Saud 
still attacked and successfully defeated the Ottoman troops.  As a result, Ibn Saud signed 
the Ottoman-Saudi treaty in May 1913, in which the Ottoman confirmed him by Imperial 
Firman’ the governor of Najd.   
The conquest of Hasa resulted in two issues for Ibn Saud.  First, the dominated 
Shia region of Hasa was reincorporated into the Saudi state.  Ibn Saud entered into an 
agreement with the Shi’a ulama that would allow the Shia in Hasa to maintain their 
religious freedom as long as they pledged allegiance to Ibn Saud.  This agreement would 
never fully be honored by the Wahhabis as they view the Shia as rafida (those that reject 
faith) and would have serious consequences later during the Ikhwan rebellion that cited 
Ibn Saud’s accommodation of the Shia violating Wahhabi doctrine.  Second, with Ibn 
Saud’s appointment as governor of Najd, he was viewed by the British as an Ottoman 
vassal and withdrew from treaty negations to confer protection status upon the Saudi 
state.71 
The onset of the First World War would, once again, change the dynamic of 
relationships on the Arabian Peninsula.  The Ottomans were the first to attempt to resolve 
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their differences with the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula.  Ibn Saud signed the Ottoman-
Saudi Convention in 1914, which granted Ibn Saud a family line of succession as rulers 
of Najd in exchange for Ibn Saud’s promise of military support to the Ottomans and 
restraining from engaging into treaties with foreign governments or ceding lands to them.  
With Britain now at war with the Ottomans, the previous agreement between the two 
powers, excluding British intervention into Ottoman territories, were now void; the 
British began searching for allies on the Arabian Peninsula.  In December 1915, Ibn Saud 
violated his treaty with the Ottomans and signed the Anglo-Saudi Treaty.  This treaty 
granted Ibn Saud and his claimed territories the military protection of the British 
government.  In exchange for British protection, Ibn Saud was provided with arms and 
money to continue to fight the Rashidis, as long as he did not enter into treaties with other 
governments or commit any acts of aggression towards any of Britain’s other protected 
Gulf States.  Ibn Saud was unable to take Ha’il and it remained part of the Ottoman 
Empire for the course of the war; however, he used this conflict with the Rashidis to 
obtain additional British aid, arms and supplies.72   
The end of the First World War did not end the battle for the Arabian Peninsula, 
as both Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid solidified control over their territories with plans to 
expand in the wake of the fall of the Ottoman Empire.  Ibn Rashid, without the assistance 
of his former Ottoman allies, was unable to repeal Ibn Saud’s attacks on Ha’il, and by 
1921, Ha’il fell under Saudi control.  The fall of Ha’il marked the end of the Rashidis 
emirate, leaving the Saudis in a good position to be the dominating power on the Arabian 
Peninsula.73   
With his long-term rival, Ibn Rashid, defeated, Ibn Saud turned his attention to the 
Hijaz and his other rival, King Husayan.  This rivalry stemmed from a territorial dispute 
over the town of Khurma, which according to St. John Philby, began when Khurma 
switched its allegiance to Ibn Saud leading to a military clash between the Saudis and 
Hashemites.  The Hashemites’ army would be defeated in Khurma and retreated to 
Turaba where the Saudis completely destroyed them.  This Hashemite defeat lead to an 
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armistice agreement between the two rulers that suspended hostilities for four years and 
granted control of Khurma and Turaba to Ibn Saud.  As a possible response to Britain 
support for Hashemite kingdoms in Iraq and Trans-Jordan, and with the armistice 
agreement expired, Ibn Saud decided to go on the offensive to expand his territory into 
southern Hijaz, specifically Asir ruled by the Idrisis emirate.  The emir of Adha, the 
capital of Asir, swore allegiance to Ibn Suad in 1922 and was subsequently occupied by 
Saudi forces.74 
Ibn Saud’s aggressive assault that followed the occupation of Adha is most likely 
because of the British discontinuing his monthly stipend and King Husayan assuming the 
caliphate in 1924.  Ibn Saud ransacked Ta’if for three days, which forced King Husayan, 
under pressure from his subjects, to abdicate in favor of his son, Ali.  The abdication was 
Ibn Saud’s green light to invade the holy city of Mecca.  On December 5, 1925, Saudi 
forces entered and took control of Mecca and forced Ali to flee to Jeddah.  Ibn Saud 
followed Ali to Jeddah, and again forcing him to surrender the city and with Medina 
already under Saudi control, Ibn Saud declared himself King of the Hijaz.  By January 
1926, the notables of the Hijaz  proclaimed him King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Najd.  
For the first time since the fall of the First Saudi State, the territories of Najd, Hijaz, Hasa 
and Asir were under the control of the Saudi-Wahhabi emirate and set the foundation for 
the establishment of the modern Saudi Kingdom.75   
The British, in an attempt to maintain border stability between Ibn Saud and the 
newly create Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Trans-Jordan, mediated the signing of two 
treaties, Bahra and Hadda agreements that closed the borders between the states to the 
migrations of any tribes, which was used by the Ikhwan as another reason to challenge 
Ibn Saud authority.  Ibn Saud entered into the Treaty of Mecca to solidify his control of 
Asir, in which Hassan Ibn Ali al-Idrisi swore allegiance to Ibn Saud, recognized his titles, 
and would refrain from engaging into agreements with any foreign governments without 
the permission of Ibn Saud.  In return, the Asir emirate was given semi-autonomous 
                                                 
74 Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, 44–45. 
75 Ibid., 46. 
 25
status (only until 1930) to coexist with the Saudi-Wahhabi emirate.76  The British, feeling 
their 1915 treaty with Ibn Saud was not longer valid, reengaged Ibn Saud in treaty 
negotiations and signed the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927.  This treaty had the British 
recognize the complete independence of the Saudi-Wahhabi emirate and Ibn Saud’s right 
to choose his successor in return for assurance Ibn Sauds maintains friendly relations 
with all British-protected Gulf emirates.  The relationship that Ibn Saud shared with the 
British would remain forever ambiguous.77  Ibn Saud, with the assistance of the British 
Royal Air Force, did finally put down, or massacre, the Ikhwan by 1929.78  This act 
solidified Ibn Saud’s power on the Arabian Peninsula and on September 22, 1932, he 
proclaimed his realm to be the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.79     
G. CONCLUSION 
The origins of Wahhabism have provided insight into the life and motivations of 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, in an effort to understand and interpret 
better the tenets of his ideology examined in the next chapter.  The analysis of the origins 
of the Saudi states have provided insight into how the relationship between the political 
ruling Saudis and the religious Wahhabis evolved and was critical in the development of 
the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  The next chapter analyzes the Wahhabi ideology 
in greater detail, compares it with the other competing Islamic ideologies of Salafism and 
Islamism and attempts to conclude what Wahhabism’s role might have been in the spread 
of global terrorism. 
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III. UNDERSTANDING WAHHABISM, SALAFISM AND 
ISLAMISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to address the concerns raised in the aftermath of the September 11th 
attacks and to determine if Wahhabism had any role in the spread of the global jihad 
responsible for this attack, this chapter attempts to evaluate the major ideologies that exist 
in the modern Islamic world to clear the blurred lines between Wahhabism, neo-
Wahhabism, Salafism, neo-Salafism, moderate and radical Islamists commonly lumped 
together under the common title of “Islamism.”  This common mistake made by world 
leaders, policymakers, academics, journalists and the average citizen are due to the fact 
that all of these groups share “similar literal doctrines and concepts of jihad, Islamic state, 
shari’a or prophetic traditions.”80  Even though these ideologies share such similarities, 
their connotations and discourses differ according to each of them; resulting in the 
importance for understanding and studying these ideologies to determine which of these 
ideologies are truly a threat and those that may be allies in the growing global war on 
terrorism.  This chapter discusses each of these major ideologies separately, compare and 
contrast them and attempt to offer a conclusion that suggests that Wahhabism, although 
not directly responsible for the ideology associated with the spread of the global jihad, 
did have a passive influence on associated ideologies. 
B. WAHHABISM / NEO-WAHHABISM 
The first concept that must be understood when studying Wahhabism is that it 
considers itself as the only true Salafist movement and by others as the Salafism of Saudi 
Arabia.81  This characterization is supported by the fact that Wahhabism “is the extreme 
interpretation of puritanical Islam which has been the basis of legitimacy of the Saudi 
royal family and there are many similarities between Wahhabi Islam and the doctrines of 
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the Muslim Brotherhood.”82  Wahhabism arose in Najd in Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth 
century as a religious revivalist movement led by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-
1892) as he believed that over the centuries, since the beginning of Islam Muslim, 
societies had reverted into a jahiliyya (era of ignorance) through the prevention of 
Islam.83  The goals of the movement were to restore the true meaning of tawhid (oneness 
with God or monotheism) by the people, to disregard traditional disciplines and practices 
that had evolved over the centuries, such as theology and jurisprudence, and to eliminate 
the worshiping of venerated individuals other then God.84  Wahhabism accepts tawhid as 
a core concept of Islam; however, it claims that correct belief is insufficient without a 
joining with pure Islamic behavior.  This claim is interpreted to mean that, in the view of 
Wahhabism, belief in God is not enough without the discontinuing of acts and customs 
that promote idolatry and kufr (disbelief).  Therefore, Wahhabism bans the practices of 
listening to certain types of music, drawing any living thing with a soul, praying at tombs 
and shrines (including the Prophet’s tomb) and following any of the madhhabs (schools 
of Islamic jurisprudence) that deviate from the original sources (as blind imitation of past 
scholars is discouraged, but to the extent these scholars base their judgments on the 
Qur’an, Sunna, and Salaf al-Salih then it is permissible to accept their rulings), all of 
which constitute Sunni orthodoxy and are practiced by all Sunni Muslims outside of 
Saudi Arabia.85   
The Wahhabis separate themselves from the Sunni orthodox by claiming to 
follow the example outlines by al-salaf al-salih (the pious ancestors) calling themselves 
salafists, and claiming that the pious ancestors are the model that all Muslims should 
emulate.  This belief led them to accuse the majority of Sunni Muslims living under the 
Ottoman caliphate (including the caliphate itself) of committing bid’a (innovation) and 
kufr (unbelief) as the political system was unknown to the pious ancestors.86  They also 
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differentiate themselves from other Muslims (including other salafists) through their 
literal unorthodox understanding of God’s attributes by associating human attributes to 
God, a point reinforced when Ibn Baz, the late Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, stated “the 
Prophet’s Companions and their followers believe in a direction for Allah, and that is the 
direction of elevation, for the exalted is above the throne without giving an example and 
without entering into modality.”87  Orthodox Sunni Muslims do not share this opinion.   
The Wahhabis also declared that all Shi’a and Sunni Muslim (non-Wahhabi) that 
do not follow in the path of the pious ancestors are subject to takfir (excommunication), 
essentially stating that all Muslims that did not follow Wahhabism were guilty of shirk 
(sin of polytheism).88  This accusation had major implications as it allowed for “jihad 
against one’s own people,”89 which gave the Wahhabis the justification to kill other 
Muslims and to establish their own independent Islamic state resulting in a number of 
murderous campaigns that culminated in the establishment of the modern Saudi State (or 
Kingdom).  With the creation of the modern state by Abd al-Aziz, “Wahhabism was then 
forcefully changed from a movement of a revolutionary jihad and theological takfiri  
purification to a movement of a conservative social, political, theological, and religious 
da‘wa (call) and to justifying the institution that upholds loyalty to the royal Saudi family 
and the King's absolute power.”90  With the Wahhabi ulama (religious scholars) being 
effectively a state institution, they gave rise to the opinions of non-state Wahhabis that 
disagreed with the ulama on every issue and re-asserting the neo-Wahhabi perspective. 
Moussalli dates the rise of this neo-Wahhabism to the aftermath of the Gulf War 
where a great deal of dissatisfaction existed with the Saudi monarchy and the ulama for 
their decision to request U.S. assistance in removing Iraq from Kuwait and for allowing 
these non-Muslim (or infidel) forces into Saudi Arabia.  While the Neo-Wahhabism did 
wish to overthrow the Saudi monarchy and the Wahhabi ulama; it did, however, still 
share the fundamental doctrines and objectives of Wahhabism.  A demand for reform of 
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the system came from the religious scholars of Najd, who called for “the formation of a 
shura council, the review of the laws' compatibility with Islamic shari‘a, the just 
distribution of public funds and the restructuring of media and of foreign policy, away 
from alliances (with non-Muslim) not sanctioned by shari’a.” 91   The neo-Wahhabi 
movement exercised both violent and non-violent means and evolved into sub-
movements with different goals and stands on the various issues facing Islam in the 
modern world.92  One such example is the group led by Muhammad al-Mas’ari, who fled 
to London to establish the “Salafists’ first public tribune.”93  This group would later be 
divided into three separate wings: “1) the Sa‘d al-Faqih wing, representing the 
Brotherhood's line, 2) the Muhammad al-Mas‘ari wing, forming the Legal Rights 
Committee in London, 3) the Osama Bin Laden wing, calling for revolutionary 
opposition.”94  The last group, which found its origins in Afghanistan, was appalled to 
find that U.S. forces were occupying their holy land of Islam.  This violation committed 
by the Saudi monarchy and the Wahhabi ulama would prompt Bin Laden to submit a 
letter protesting U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia.  This letter, according to Moussalli, 
would be the foundation for which the neo-Wahhabi/neo-Salafist organization of al-
Qaeda was formed.95   
Although Moussalli seems to date the origins of the neo-Wahhabi movement to 
the post-Gulf war period, the author believes that evidence exists that shows the 
movement began even earlier and has just recently acquired global interests.  He also 
believes the evidence can be found in The International Crisis Group (ICG) article, 
“Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?,” which concludes that the multiple 
origins of Saudi Islamism can be divided into three sub-groups/strains: the Reformists,  
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the Rejectionists and the Jihadists.  These sub-groups/strains quite possibly may have 
been the foundation for the development of the Neo-Wahhabism movement, as described 
by Moussalli.   
The reformist strain (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya or Islamic Awakening) arose in the 
turmoil of religious activism of the 1970s and 1980s influenced by the influx of the 
exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The reformist combined the traditional 
Wahhabism in matters of social issues and the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood (or 
Salafist) approach towards political issues.96  “They distinguished themselves from the 
Wahhabi establishment by their willingness to discuss issues of contemporary 
significance rather than concentrate on abstract theological debates.”97  The reformists, 
although not responsible for the seizing of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, consider 
it a turning point for the reformist movement.  The Saudi government’s crackdown in the 
wake of this incident, unintentionally allowed the reformists to gain access to funds 
through their involvement in the educational system, which allowed for increased 
reformist participation in public debates.  However, the reformists lacked a true united 
front, and as a result, fragmented into sub-strains assimilating back into Wahhabism and 
others into the Muslim Brotherhood.98   
The rejectionist’s strain is sometimes referred to as neo-Salafist, and at other 
times, confused with the reformers.  The rejectionist’s central concern is not with the 
broader social, cultural or political issues, which were the reformer’s central concern, but 
more with the questions of individual faith, morals and ritual practices.  The rejectionists 
are also opposed to the concept of a nation-state; however, their goal is not to destroy or 
opposite nation-states, but to break withdrawal from them, and at times, revolt against 
them. Like the reformists, the rejectionists were also fragmented and did not share a 
unified front or central organizational structure.99  The rejectionists tended to operate in 
fringe communities withdrawn from society practicing “a very conservative, puritan 
                                                 





lifestyle; and informal religious study circles, which rejected both the mosque-based 
Wahhabi and the school and university-centered Sahwa teachings.”100  The most notable 
rejectionists were those of the al-Jamaa al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM), who was 
responsible for the seizing of the Grand Mosque in Mecca.  In the aftermath of this event, 
what was left of the JSM took exile in other Muslim countries and some Islamist groups 
claim to be their heirs.   
The jihadist’s strain is a result of Saudi Arabia’s active support of the Afghans in 
their war against the Soviet Union with the commitment of thousands of Saudis to fight 
in addition to the financial and logistic support provided.  Those that participated were 
transformed into believing that they were part of culture of violent resistance.  The Saudis 
would return from this conflict with a militaristic and violent worldview and greater 
understanding of politics outside of Saudi Arabia.101  These Saudis also had the ability to 
travel in and out of Saudi Arabia freely, which gave them extensive access to Saudi 
youths to influence and recruit them to the jihadist cause.  Many of these influenced 
youths would seek to obtain military training and combat experience, which led them to 
al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.  The jihadist believed that the only way to enact political 
or social change was with violence, which was not shared by the reformists and 
rejectionists as a whole, but some of the rejectionists did drift towards more violent 
means of activism.102 
Whether the neo-Wahhabi movement began in the 1970s or 1990s, two distinct 
facts remain clear when comparing neo-Wahhabism and Wahhabism.  First, neo-
Wahhabism and Wahhabism share the same fundamental beliefs, doctrines, practices and 
objectives.  Second, the differences between the two groups were the methods or means 
that they employed to meet those objectives.  The next section outlines the ideologies of 
Salafism and neo-Salafism, which have glaring similarities to Wahhabism and neo-
Wahhabism and strengthens the case that these ideologies are interchangeable.     
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C. SALAFISM/NEO-SALAFISM 
Salafism is a modern movement that emerged in late 19th century under such key 
figures as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdu, and Rashid Rida, which were 
referred to as Islamic modernists.  Their form of Salafism was fundamentally different 
from contemporary Salafism.  These Salafists wanted to return to the Qur’an and Sunna 
as original sources to free them to innovate and incorporate Western ideals.  Their logic 
was based on the belief that the Qur’an and Sunna are open to many interpretations, 
whereas the rulings by jurists from the madhhabs, were more constraining.  They rejected 
taqlid (blind imitation) and called for opening the gates of ijtihad (new interpretations).  
The Salafism discussed in this section is contemporary Salafism practiced by Qutb and 
others, and not the original Salafism of al-Afghani, Abdu and Rida. 
Salafism is an ideological religious movement united under a common belief 
system that provides principles and methods for addressing modern day issues and 
concerns confronting the Islamic world.  Like Wahhabism, Salafism belief system finds 
its foundation in a strict adherence of the tawhid.103  “Salafis believe that by strictly 
following the rules and guidance in the Qur’an and Sunna (path or example of the 
Prophet Muhammad) they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and self-interest, 
thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God’s commands.”104  They 
conclude from this belief that there is only one true interpretation of God’s message, their 
own, and that Islamic pluralism is non-existent. Again, like Wahhabism, Salafism shares 
a common religious belief and approach to jurisprudence, but divides into sub-groups 
based on how that belief and jurisprudence should be applied to modern issues and 
concerns.105   
Three such sub-groups have emerged within the Salafi movement based on this 
differing opinion on applying their faith to modern issues and concerns.  The first sub-
group is the purists, who focus on the “nonviolent means of propagation, purification and 
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education [of Islam] and view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy.”106  The 
second sub-group is the politicos, who advocate the melding of Salafi beliefs with politics.  
The final sub group is the jihadis, who assume the militant position of using violence to 
attain the goals set forth by their Salafi belief system.  Before discussing these sub-groups 
further, it is important to understand the command belief system that they share first.107 
All Salafis are united under a common belief system that acts as the core of their 
religious understanding and interoperations of Islam.  This belief system is based heavily 
on the concept of tawhid that includes three components, which all Salafis believe must 
be met for one to be considered a true Muslim.  First, Muslims must accept that there is 
only one true God and He is the creator and sovereign of the universe.  Second, Muslims 
must accept that God is supreme and unique sharing no characteristics or traits with those 
that He has created.  This means that all must adhere to the entire shari’a, which rejects 
human-made laws and secularism as it is a challenge to God’s authority.  Finally, 
Muslims must accepted that God is the only one worthy of worship and that to worship 
others, even the Prophet, would be considered shirk.108  All Muslims already share these 
doctrines and there is no unique contribution by the group in advancing these conditions. 
In addition to the tawhid, Salafis believe that all aspects of human behavior and 
beliefs are to be governed by the Qur’an and Sunna, and to protect the tawhid, Muslims 
must maintain strict adherence to these doctrines.  Salafis believe that any action or belief 
that violates these doctrines is a form of bid’a (innovation), which would threaten tawhid.  
For example, the use of or consulting any other doctrines results in a divergence from the 
straight path resulting in deviancy and sectarianism.  The Salafis believe that they are the 
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salvation on the Day of Judgment.109  As such, like the Wahhabis, the Salafis also “reject 
the imitation of earlier scholars (taqlid), following schools of jurisprudence, and other 
widely accepted instruments for rendering religious legal opinions.”110 
Salafis believe that there are two dangerous challenges facing pure Islam in 
modern times.  The first is human desires (or innovation) that threatens the purity of 
Islam’s message by the blending of local customs with Islamic traditions in an effort to 
aid with conversions when Islam spreads to new regions.  Salafis mark culture as an 
enemy of pure Islam and make it part of their mission to eliminate the innovations 
created by culture.  The second is the application of human intellect and logic (or 
interpretation) to the Qur’an and Sunna as these doctrines, in the eyes of the Salafis, are 
self-explanatory resulting in a rejection of religious pluralism.  This rejection comes from 
the belief that interpretation strips God of his attributes and literal understanding would 
imply anthropomorphism.  Therefore, the Salafism subscribe to a school of thought that 
understanding is to be achieved without understanding the how as God’s attributes are 
beyond human comprehension.111 
As a result of these challenges, Salafis consider themselves in constant battle with 
rationalists (i.e., human intellect and logic) and human desires.  This battle has placed a 
great emphasis on the studying of Islam and scholars, which some characterize the 
movement as a vast educational network.  “Without scholars, religious knowledge and 
education wither, as does the Salafi mission to promote tawhid.”112  Therefore, all the 
sub-groups recognize the importance of the centrality of the scholars, which results in 
their common belief system.113  
The first sub-group is the purists (or the reformers) primarily concerned with 
maintaining the purity of Islam convened by the Qur’an, Sunna and the consensus of the 
Prophet’s companions.  They believe that the goals of the Salafi movement should be to 
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promote their belief system and combating the deviating forces that threaten it by 
following the example set by the Prophet when he founded Islam.  They consider that the 
introduction of politics or taking political actions before Islam is purified can only result 
in corruption and injustice, because society would be ignorant to understanding the tents 
of faith.  Therefore, they follow a three-step method of implementation: 1) da’wa 
(propagation), 2) tazkiyya (purification) and 3) tarbiya (religious education or 
cultivation).114   
The purists believe themselves to be the vanguards protecting the purity of Islam 
and tawhid with no political connotations attached.  For this reason, some purists even 
reject the idea of Salafism as a movement.  The purists believe that the West intends to 
destroy Islam and they responded to this by creating a nonviolent ideological campaign 
that eliminates Western logic from religious discussions.  This nonviolent campaign has 
at times led to isolationism to remove the chance for non-believers and purists to interact, 
and thus, eliminating any chance of corruption or deviant influences to challenge the 
purity of Islam. 115   This isolationist attitude is justified by their belief that “if all 
knowledge and guidance are in the sources of Islam, nonbelievers offer nothing.”116  
The purists also believe in distinguishing between the Salafi belief system and the 
method in which it is implemented.  Purists believe that Islam should be implemented in 
the prophetic model, and to be a Muslim, it is necessary to execute both belief and 
method properly.  It is from this point that their disapproval of the other two sub-groups 
stems, as their use of politics, political parties and democracy are considered to be a 
Western innovation, and therefore, a threat to true Salafism.117  This critical view of the 
other sub-groups taken by the purists is based on their non-Islamic methods and results in 
two significant charges rendered against them by the purists.  First, though they may 
understand and believe in the Salafi belief system, they fail to implement it utilizing the 
prophetic model.  Second, they are viewed to be rationalists driven by human desire and 
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implementing strategies without Islamic sources.  This has resulted in the purists 
boycotting (hajr) their fellow Salafis and banning all forms of publications from either 
sub-group.  The purists use this boycott as part of their strategy to purify Islam using the 
prophetic model.118  The most prominent example of the purists in Islam today is the 
Wahhabi ulama of Saudi Arabia that ascribe to the purists’ model of Salafism.  This leads 
the author to conclude that the purists are representative of Salafism and the politicos and 
jihadis are most representative of neo-Salafism, which is identical to the divisions within 
Wahhabism. 
The second sub-group, the politicos (or the rejectionist), claimed a greater 
understanding of modern issues and concerns in comparison to the purists, and are 
therefore, better suited to implement and apply the Salafi belief system in modern context.  
As Saudi Arabia avoided colonization, the priority for the purists (i.e., the Wahhabi 
ulama) was the purity of Islam and the politics were simply left to the rulers.  It was not 
until the introduction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia that the politicos were 
able to gain any influence or power.  The brotherhood introduced a politically driven 
agenda into the purists’ Saudi community, which encouraged the youth of the county to 
being inquiring about modern world events.  The politicos believed it was their duty to 
engage in political discussions and to be critical of un-Islamic rulers and policies to 
expand their realm of influence and pass strictly religious matters while still holding true 
to their Salafi belief system.  The politicos believed that truly to protect the purity of 
Islam, it was necessary to address political issues; otherwise, their rulers could destroy 
Islam.119 
The fatwa issued by the purists (i.e., the Wahhabi ulama) during the Gulf War that 
allowed U.S. forces to enter and be based in Saudi Arabia is considered the point at 
which the politicos, for the first time, openly opposed the Saudi government and the 
ulama.  The politicos claimed that U.S. presence on the Arabian Peninsula was an 
invitation for colonization.  The politicos made it clear that they were not questioning the 
purists’ beliefs, but rather, whether they truly understood the context for applying their 
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beliefs.  The politicos charged the purists on this point as being isolated from world 
politics and lacked the knowledge or skills to issue fatwas on matters concerning 
politics.120   
The politicos charged the purists with supporting rulers destroying Islam, which 
sparked a debate between the two sub-groups.  The purists assumed the position that 
focusing on current affairs generated emotional responses, which in turn, would lead to 
deviance that would destroy tawhid and the purity of Islam.  The politicos argued that 
purists lacked an understanding of the modern issues facing Islam, and therefore, lacked 
the context to implement Salafi beliefs properly to address current issues of 
jurisprudence.121  This debate strengthens the division between the politicos and the 
purists and the politicos claims of being more knowledgeable with regard to current 
issues facing Muslims, and therefore, more qualified to implement the Salafi belief 
system better in the proper context.122  The jihadis sub-group took on this debate as well, 
but they introduced violent militant action as a method for attaining results. 
The final sub-group, the jihadis, gained their experience and power in exactly the 
same manner as the jihadis in the Wahhabism section above.  The jihadis earned their 
experience and knowledge of jihad on the battlefields of Afghanistan, unlike their 
politico counterparts, who learned of jihad in discussions of the Ikhwan at their 
universities.  The jihadis gained particular momentum and power after the Saudi 
crackdown on politicos in the post-Gulf war period.  This allowed the jihadis the 
opportunity to fill the vacancy left by the politicos and openly oppose the purists for their 
allowance of U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia.  The jihadis charged the purists with 
ignorance of the current state of affairs, and most of all, for misleading the people by 
being puppets of the regime, not protectors of the Salafi belief system.  The jihadis 
conveyed this by referring to the ulama as the scholars of rulers (al-ulama al-sulta), 
effectively stating that the ulama  were incapable of issuing fatwas without the approval 
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of the rulers, as they were part of the Ministry of Interior.123  Jihadis claimed that these 
scholars “speak in their masters’ languages and in the concepts of the enemy of the umma 
(community).”124  This constitutes the crux of the jihadis’ criticisms of the purists and the 
bases for which they made their judgments.  The jihadis, like the politicos, were not 
challenging the purists on their Salafi beliefs, but more on their failure to address the 
injustices persecuted by the regimes that they supported and effectively failing to protect 
tawhid and Islam. 
The divisions between Salafism and neo-Salafism, like the divisions between 
Wahhabism and neo-Wahhabism, are not based on differing opinions concerning the 
belief system, the doctrines used to justify that belief or the objectives and practices of 
those beliefs. The difference lies in the methods in which the belief system applies to the 
current issues facing the Muslim world.  Vast similarities exist between the Wahhabi and 
Salafi belief systems; however, those similarities do not transfer to the methods in which 
they are implemented or executed by their respective sub-groups.  Thus, the author is led 
to the conclusion, as supported by the opinions of the various Middle East experts 
presented in the introduction that these two ideologies are similar; however, they are not 
interchangeable.  The next section evaluates the final ideology present in the Muslim 
world, Islamism. 
D. ISLAMISM 
Islamism focuses primarily on the political aspect assisted by Islam as a means of 
promoting a modern Islamic resistance.  It centers on the Muslim Brotherhood’s goal of 
establishing an Islamic state as the first step in implementing the shari’a.  The Islamists 
remain committed to their goals of returning to the fundamentals of Islam; however, they 
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rule and democracy into their modern Islamic thought.  This approach has been taken, as 
it is the belief of the Islamist that it is necessary to modernize their concept of an Islamic 
state.125   
Islamism, like Wahhabism and Salafism, has splintered into distinct groups that 
share similar beliefs and objectives, but disagree on how to attain those objectives.  These 
two groups are the moderates and the radical Islamists.  The divide between these two 
groups developed under the leadership of Sayyid Qutb, as he rejected all dealings and 
intellectual openness with the West in the fulfillment of establishing an Islamic state.126  
He believed the Islamic state was not a tool, but a fundamental principle of belief as it 
signified “the community’s submission to God on the basis of shari’a and represents 
political and ideological obedience to God.”127  He believed without this submission and 
obedience to God that any forms of Western political tools (constitutions, laws, etc.) were 
illegitimate and would result in a state that would decay into a jahiliyya.  This opinion 
was further narrowed by the Ayatollah al-Khumayni, who claimed, “while shari’a 
theoretically legitimizes a government, only the rule of the jurist actualizes its 
legitimacy.” 128   The opinions expressed by Qutb and al-Khumayni constitute the 
ideological foundation of the radical Islamist movements, where as the moderate Islamist 
movements broke from Qutb and followed the beliefs presented by al-Banna’s concept of 
the Islamic state, constitutional rule and multi-party politics.129  
As stated above, the major point of contention between the moderates and the 
radicals results from the “conditions and principles of transforming a religiously 
motivated political agenda into daily life.”130  The radicals do not view the shura as a 
mere religious concept for promoting democratic ideals, such as individual freedom and 
social agreements, but it represents the public will in combination with the divine will.  
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Radicals believe that any deviation from the divine will is a religious violation and that 
individual freedom is dependent on it.  This interoperation does not allow for political 
contracts with rulers or governments, like the moderates, as it results in pluralism, which 
leads to disunity.  Radicals believe that the fulfillment of this divine will, subordinating 
individuals and groups to the state, is the only means of establishing an Islamic state.  
The radicals’ belief in the divine will implies that the state defines the public will as 
giving the state the authority to make the normative decisions in people’s lives through 
the institutionalization of the shura and ijma.  This concept also implies that the state is 
not answerable to its people, but only answerable to God or the shari’a, therefore making 
legitimacy an internal state function not open to public debate.  This implies that as long 
as the state adheres to the shari’a, there is no legitimate justification for challenging or 
overthrowing the government of that state.  The radicals in doing so have transformed 
individual religiosity into a moral and political state controlled common public will.131   
The moderate Islamist ideology postulates that democracy and pluralism are 
religious rights and views their normative character as absolute.  Their understanding of 
these Western political concepts is dependent on the modern interpretation of the sources 
of religion and the means of some basic doctrines, such as “shura (consultation), 
ijma‘ (consensus), ikhtilaf (difference), ahl al-dhimma ([non-Muslim] minorities), hisba 
(enjoining the good and forbidding evil), and similar doctrines;”132  doctrines the radicals 
claim to be incompatible with such Western political concepts.   
The moderates believe that political rule is a religious matter, because of the 
agreement and consent of the people, which is contrary to the Wahhabi and Salafi 
interpretations.  The moderates also believe that arbitration was a choice of the people 
used to settle many significant events in Islamic history and like government; arbitration 
rests with “the people’s contractual authority to shape and reshape its life.”133  This belief 
in communal arbitration, although incontestable, was set aside in the pursuit of increasing  
 
                                                 




states power.  The moderates believe that a possible return to this concept of communal 
arbitration might be a means to address the issues facing the Muslim world concerning 
the exercising of political power and the political legitimacy of rulers and states.134  
The moderates believe that the doctrines of shura and ijma are the keys to 
religiously developing democratic notions (government and politics) in addition to human 
rights, because they remove the divine perception of political government by reducing its 
legitimacy to the consent of the people.  The moderates believe that shura, like 
democracy, provides the religious legitimacy to maintain a government since its 
acceptance is drawn from the approval of the majority.  They believe the implementation 
of ikhtilaf allows for the acceptance of pluralistic understanding of the diversity of 
religion and philosophy, but also the political aspects as well.  The moderates believe that 
implementation of these doctrines could release the majorities from the thumbs of the 
minorities’ currently in power and remove the tyranny that currently exists in the Muslim 
world.  They believe these doctrines have been manipulated and corrupted by the current 
tyrannical/authoritarian government’s political and religious elites as a means of securing 
their own political, social, religious and economic interests at the expense of the majority 
of the people, as in the case of Wahhabism and Salafism.   
The moderates believe that the blending of Western political ideals and Islam is 
currently ongoing as it is a primary concern of modern Islamic political thought and the 
justifications for the current tyrannical/authoritarian are disappearing as they are 
obstacles in the effort to establishing free Muslim societies capable of leading good 
religious lives.135  The moderates perceive this blending of religion and democracy in the 
form of the shura as a “quest for popular empowerment vis-à-vis the oppressive state.”136  
This empowerment is solidified by the Qur’anic doctrines, as it is authenticated in the 
Qur’an and Sunna, and supersedes the coercive power utilized for legitimacy by modern 
tyrannical/authoritarian Muslim states.  States that fail to seek the consent of the majority 
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and oppose this empowerment are considered illegitimate.137  The moderates believe that 
the causes of violence in these illegitimate states are due to the absence of a pluralistic 
society and democratic institutions within Islamic states removing the non-violent 
mechanisms that the people could employ to settle grievances.138  Violence has been far 
replaced as a mechanism for the political participation and instead the moderates have 
transformed “modern jurisprudence into an ideologically derived political discourse.”139  
Individuals cannot achieve this discourse, only attainable through the mechanism of the 
state, and therefore, the only credible understanding is derived through shura in the form 
of politics, which is a concept dissimilar from those found in Wahhabism and 
Salafism.140   
Although the arguments made above by Moussalli are sound in their own right, 
the ICG in Understanding Islamism, concludes that simply dividing Islamism into two 
groups, the moderates and the radicals, fails to address the diversity of outlook, methods 
and purposes that can actually be seen in Islamism.141  The ICG first distinguishes 
between Shiite and Sunni Islamism.  Shiite Islamism was founded during the 1979 
Iranian Revolution, but since Shiites are normally a minority in most Muslim states, their 
movements have been communal in nature focusing on the needs of their specific 
community in relation to others and the state.  This has resulted in Shiite Islamism 
remaining localized and small, which has allowed it to remain united, unlike their Sunni 
brothers.  Sunni Islamism, the one most commonly associated with the term Islamism by 
the West, is characterized as conveying radical and fundamental rhetoric that threatens 
Western interests.  However, this characterization is very monolithic in nature, as Sunni 
Islamism can be divided into three separate movements/groups: Political, Missionary and 
Jihadi.142  Islamists share a common belief that “they found their activism on traditions 
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and teachings of Islam as contained in scripture and authoritative commentaries.”143  
With this shared belief, all of the movements/groups share the common objectives of 
attempting to “reconcile tradition and modernity, to preserve those aspects of tradition 
considered to be essential by adapting in various ways to modern conditions; all select 
from tradition, borrow selectively from the West and adopt aspects of modernity.”144  
The divergence arises from how each movement/group envisions the primary issue facing 
the Muslim world and what they each believe is the necessary, possible and advisable 
method or means of achieving their collective objectives.145 
The political Islamists are most represented by the activities of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other similar political groups within the Muslim world.  The political 
Islamists take issue with the mismanagement, injustice and poor governance of many of 
the Muslim states throughout the world calling for political reforms to be accomplished 
through the exercise of political activism.146  Their purpose is to attain political power at 
a national level by accepting the concept of the modern nation-state, operating within the 
current political systems, avoiding violence (unless opposing foreign occupiers), 
conveying reformist vice revolutionary attitudes through the employment of democratic 
norms.147  They give priority to political action vice religious proselytism and organize 
themselves into political parties rather than resorting to violence to attain their political 
power, as demonstrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-i Islami and the Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi (AKP).148  The political Islamists, through their various movements, 
have also proven that they are capable and inclined to accept modernist and democratic 
ideals.149   
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The missionary Islamists are represented by two main variants: the Tablighi and 
Salafiyya movements.  Both groups share the purpose of “preservation of the Muslim 
identity and the Islamic faith and moral order against the forces of unbelief, and the 
characteristic actors are missionaries (du'ah), and the ulama.” 150   The missionary 
Islamists take issue with the corrupting of Islamic values and the weakening of faith.  
They “give priority to a form of moral and spiritual rearmament that champions 
individual virtue as the condition of good government as well as of collective 
salvation.”151  They avoid engaging in political activism and associating with political 
parties, as they do not seek any form of political power.  They instead focus on preaching 
to restore or revive the faith and use this to preserve the unity of the community through 
upholding the moral order expressed in Islam.152   
The jihadi Islamists, the group with which most Westerns associate all Islamist, 
are the militia or violent arm of Islamism that can be divided into three separate variants 
in how they execute the armed struggle.  The first variant is the internals, who execute the 
jihad against corrupt or impious Muslim states or the “near enemy.”  This variant of jihad 
has yet to produce any successful outcomes, which is important in understanding the final 
group.  The second variant is the irredentists, who are determined to reclaim former 
Muslim lands either being ruled or occupied by non-Muslims.  The final variant is the 
globalists, who are conducting a jihad against the West (specifically the U.S. and its 
allies) or the “far enemy.”  The failure of the internals to claim any victory is considered 
a contributing factor in the rise of this last variant, which is being carried out by al-Qaeda 
and networks supported by them.153  The jihadi Islamist, all variants, take issue with the 
political and military influences non-Muslims have over Muslim governments; therefore, 
placing their priority on armed resistance as the only means of removing such influence 
and protecting Islam from corruption.154   
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This section presented two differing opinions or representations of how Islamism 
can be interpreted.  Regardless of expressing Islamism in terms of moderates and radicals 
or political, missionary or jihadi, it is possible to draw some conclusions.  First, the 
moderates (or political) seem to be adaptable and inclined to work within current systems, 
accept democratic ideals and avoid the use of violence to attain these goals.  Second, the 
radicals (or jihadis) seem to be the movement/group that poses the threat to the interests 
of current Muslim regimes and the West.  Finally, based on these conclusions and 
conclusions made in pervious sections, the enemy seems to stem from either neo-
Wahhabism/neo-Salafism or radical Islamism.  The next section compares these two 
ideologies in an attempt to determine which ideology had the strongest influence in the 
spread of the global jihad.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The war in Afghanistan against the Soviets (1979-1989) was the melting pot that 
brought the three major ideologies (Abdallah Azzam’s Salafism, Osama Bin Laden’s 
Wahhabism and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s radical Islamism) together in one area for the first 
time.  Radical Islamist, Wahhabi and Salafi militias from all over the Muslim world 
converged in a common goal of repealing the Soviet invaders from Muslim lands.155  
“The most notorious manifestation of that deadly combination is al-Qaeda along with its 
ideological and military affiliates that have spread throughout the Muslim world.”156  The 
neo-Wahhabis, neo-Salafis and radical Islamist ideologies that emerged from this melting 
can be classified under one name: takfiri jihadist.  This new group has managed to imbed 
themselves in different parties becoming indirectly involved in different contexts 
representing a transformation of conflicting Islamic ideologies into one form of radical 
jihadism.157  This chapter analyzed the three major ideologies (Wahhabism, Salafism and 
Islamism) that exist in the Muslim world in an attempt to determine if Wahhabism was a 
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factor in the spread of the global jihad.  Through the analysis of these three major 
ideologies, a number of conclusions can be made in an attempt to answer this question.  
First, Wahhabism and Salafism are not interchangeable ideologies although they 
share a similar belief system that at times leads people to believe or support such 
expressions that “All Wahhabis are Salafis” and “Wahhabism is the Salafism of Saudi 
Arabia” are incorrect as the methods that each ideology implemented and executed are 
completely different.   
Second, in general, Wahhabism has not spawned violent extremism, but a 
particular brand of Wahhabism known as neo-Wahhabism.  Therefore, the spread of 
violent extremism can be linked more closely to neo-Wahhabism and neo-Salafism, 
because of the methods they employ to obtain their stated objectives and their ideological 
association with Osama bin Laden’s terrorist organization: Al-Qaeda.  Radical Islamism, 
although theologically and politically very different from neo-Wahhabism and neo-
Salafism, shares the same objectives and executes the same methods to achieve those 
objectives and they have merged together creating the takfiri jihadist.  Wahhabism alone 
has not lead to the spread of the global terrorism.  It has contributed through its splintered 
sub-groups of neo-Wahhabism/neo-Salafism that melded with radical Islamist’s 
ideologies creating global terrorism (i.e., takfiri jihadist). 
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IV. EXPORTING WAHHABISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Initially, to maintain good relations with other Muslims states, the Saudi 
government would offer concessions or apologizes for the practices of Wahhabism, 
thereby alleviating their concerns in regard to the disposition of the two holy cities of 
Islam: Mecca and Medina.  By the 1950s, this policy of apologizing to maintain Muslim 
alliance had ended, due mostly to Saudi Arabia’s alliances with the British and later, the 
U.S. that rid them of their need to maintain their Muslim alliances.  Combined with their 
new Western alliances, and the influx of the petrodollars from the oil discovered in the 
early twentieth century, gave the Saudis the power to withstand the criticisms emanating 
from moderate Muslim countries.  This gave the Saudis complete control of the two holy 
cities, dominance over the brand of Islam practiced in the holy land and the power to 
exercise Wahhabism without modifying or moderating it.  By the 1970s, a turning point 
occurred concerning Wahhabism that was currently only an internal affair for the Saudis.  
The Saudis, with their increased strength of the petrodollar, embarked on an aggressive 
campaign to export Wahhabism to the rest of the Muslim world.  The assistance began 
initially as monetary support to various organizations and groups, classified by some to 
be fanatical, in various Muslim countries.  By the 1980s, that backing had evolved into a 
much more sophisticated and comprehensive campaign.  The Saudis established 
numerous proxy organizations that would distribute Wahhabi literature and Qur’ans 
translated into local dialects, created a vast network of financial support dedicated to 
publishers, madrasas, mosques, organizations and individuals that not only accepted 
Wahhabism, but also became its advocate.  The result was a large number of Islamic 
movements, groups and organizations that would alter their messages to align themselves 
with Wahhabism to gain Saudi patronage.158 
Kahled Abou El Fadl, in his book The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the 
Extremists, outlines four major reasons why Wahhabism was able to survive and expand 
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into contemporary Islam.  First, Wahhabi rebellion against Ottoman rule set a powerful 
precedent for notions of Arab self-determination and autonomy that appealed to some of 
the Muslims that ascribed to the emerging ideologies of Arab nationalism.  Second, 
Wahhabism avocation of returning to the early period of the “Rightly Guided” (al-salaf 
al-salih) was liberating to many Muslim reformers as it meant a rebirth of ijtihad (process 
of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Qur'an 
and the Sunnah), which would remove all pervious interpretations, allowing for a fresh 
look at the original sources.  Third, by controlling the two holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina, the Saudis acquired the ability to influence the scores of pilgrims participating in 
the hajj giving them the ability to influence and quite possibly control Islam’s belief 
system.  Finally, the introduction of vast wealth of petrodollars afforded the Saudis the 
necessary funds to export Wahhabism aggressively and gain influence in the Muslim 
world in return for their patronage.159   
It is not surprising that in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks that the 
Saudis would come under considerable scrutiny from the U.S. and other Western powers 
because of their aggressive campaign of exporting Wahhabism.  The world was aware of 
the Saudi’s actions in the three decades prior, but now believed that their actions had 
spawned a radical and extremist ideology and apparatus of support that provided the 
terrorist the means in which to execute such attacks.  This chapter examines the 
mechanisms (supporting jihadi movements, education, monopoly of media sources, 
financial support and terrorist associations) used in the exportation of Wahhabism and the 
accusations associated with each in an effort to determine the Saudi Arabian 
government’s involvement in the spread of global terrorism. 
B. SUPPORTING JIHADI MOVEMENTS 
The Saudi’s support for the various jihadi movements or campaigns that have 
occurred throughout the Muslim world have to be separated into two categories: pre-11 
September and post-11 September.  The pre-11 September period encompasses Saudi 
support for the jihadi movements in Afghanistan (1979-1989) in the struggle against the 
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Soviet invaders, support for the Taliban (1996–2001) and the other jihadi movements that 
occurred in other Muslim countries.  The post-11 September period shows a decline of 
Saudi support, which some experts would call a complete 180-degree change in policy, 
for jihadi movements especially in Afghanistan (2001–present) and Iraq (2003–present). 
First, it is important to understand how Wahhabis define jihad.  Natana DeLong-
Bas, in her book Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, provides the 
definition of jihad as understood by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.  “Jihad is a fard kifayah, or 
collective duty, required by those who fulfill the requirements established by God: 
submission to Islam, maturity, financial ability, free (as opposed to slave) status, the 
intent to remember and serve God in this endeavor, and good moral character”160 to be 
executed annually.  A Muslim is obligated to participate in jihad except for periods of 
hajj (pilgrimage) or of peace and truce.  Ibn Abd al-Wahhab continues to define the 
purpose of jihad as, “the protection and aggrandizement of the Muslim community as a 
whole, not personnel gain or glory.”161   She claims that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never 
defined jihad as an individual undertaking, as this is an adaption created by modern 
extremists and that his interpretation only required individuals to answer the call for jihad 
to fulfill duties.162  An interpretation disputed by other experts as being an extremely 
blurred interpretation and contradicted by Wahhabis themselves.  The first major call to 
jihad in the twentieth century would occur because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1979.   
1. The Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989)  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the conflict that occurred as a result is 
viewed by many experts as the birthplace of Islamic extremism and the global terrorism.  
David Commins, in his book, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, also classifies this 
period as the “peak of Wahhabi-revivalist collaboration and triumph.”163  It is important 
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to understand that this conflict was important to the Western world as it was part of the 
greater U.S.-Soviet Cold War.  Cummins claims that because of this Western view of the 
conflict, what was overlooked or missed completely was “its function as a crucible for 
the synthesis of desperate Islamic revivalist organizations into loose coalition of 
likeminded jihadist groups that viewed the war as a struggle between Islam and 
unbelief,”164 which took the relatively insignificant jihadist (prior to Afghanistan) and 
converted them into a major force in the Muslim world.  
The jihadists were based out of Peshawar, Pakistan and were commonly known as 
the Peshawar Alliance.  They received intelligence support from Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia, recruiting assistance from Pakistani intelligence and weapons and money from 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  The Saudis benefited in two significant ways 
from involvement in this jihad.  First, they gained favorable standing in Washington, D.C. 
for their involvement in the U.S. anti-communist campaign. Secondly, they were able to 
export their young militants to Afghanistan in the name of jihad.  All told, approximately 
35,000 165  Muslim participated in the conflict or were trained at one of the many 
established frontier schools and would later participate in future jihads.  The exact 
number of Saudi volunteers is not known; however, estimates place the range at 12,000–
25,000.166  The leading Muslim in this conflict was Abdullah Azzam, who would be an 
important figure in influencing Osama bin Laden.  Azzam, through the publication of al-
Jihad, was able to spread the news of the conflict and the jihadi ideology to the rest of the 
Muslim world.167  “Azzam considered the Afghan jihad a religious duty binding on all 
Muslims, not just those of Afghanistan,” which was in terms of Islamic law as a radical 
argument.  Azzam takes the traditional definition of jihad, which is the definition 
expressed by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and modifies it.  He asserts “jihad becomes the duty of 
each individual in that land and then in other lands if the Muslims enduring aggression 
                                                 
164 Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, 174. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid., 174–175. 
 53
prove unable to repel it alone.”168  The philosophy was adopted by Bin Baaz, the Grand 
Mufti of Saudi Arabia, as justification for Saudi involvement in other jihads throughout 
the Muslim world. 
With the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the jihadists “interpret[ed] their victory as a 
sign of God’s favor and the righteousness of their struggle.”169  A struggle that for ten 
years consumed the youth and energy of idealistic Muslims, some of which would return 
to their homes to join local Islamist groups in the struggles against their “apostate” 
governments and others, would continue the struggle in places such as Bosnia, Chechnya 
and Kashmir.170  The Saudis would fill the ranks of both of these groups as they were 
transformed during the conflict, becoming part of the romanticized culture of violent 
resistance.171  
The Saudi jihadist that traveled to Afghanistan had limited political exposure with 
no domestic agenda hostile towards the Saudi government.  However, they would be 
exposed to a militaristic worldview while in Afghanistan; they would use this newly 
acquired worldview to influence the youth of Saudi Arabia fostering future participation 
of Saudis in jihadi movements.  Saudi youths began seeking combat experience in the 
various jihadi movements and with Al-Qaeda once they had established themselves in 
Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban.  The experience gained by Saudi 
volunteers in Afghanistan created a Saudi culture of support for the various jihadi 
movements and government, such as the Taliban, in the post-Afghan war period. 
2. The Taliban and Afghanistan (1996–present) 
The Taliban movement arose in 1993–1994 because of the power vacuum created 
by the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.   
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Many were former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict 
among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic 
seminaries (“madrasas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam. Some 
say this Islam is similar to the “Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi 
Arabia. Taliban practices were also consistent with conservative Pashtun 
tribal traditions.172 
The Taliban ruled through a harsh interpretation of Islamic law commonly associated 
with Wahhabism.  David Commins claims that even though the Taliban received 
assistance from both the Saudi government and Wahhabi ulama, their movement emerged 
more from the Deobandi School and not Wahhabism.173  Official Saudi involvement with 
the Taliban began in 1995, in which the Taliban regime lobbied a group of Saudi princes 
to extend assistance to them.174  Saudi Arabia was one of only three countries (Pakistan 
and United Arab Emirates being the others) officially to recognize the Taliban as the 
official government of Afghanistan and was seen as a partner in Saudi Arabia’s anti-
Iranian campaign.  Saudi intelligence also worked with Taliban leaders to suppress anti-
Saudi rhetoric being promulgated by Al-Qaeda.  There was even discussion of a Saudi-
Afghani panel to discuss the disposition of Osama bin Laden that never came to 
fruition.175  During a visit by the Taliban’s leadership to Saudi Arabia in 1997, King 
Fahd “expressed happiness at the good measures taken by the Taliban and over the 
imposition of shari’a in our country.”176  However, the Al-Qaeda’s attacks of September 
11, 2001, led the Saudi government to break all ties with the Taliban and a reversal of 
Saudi policy towards support jihadi movements, although seen more in Iraq then in 
Afghanistan. 
U.S. officials noted that the Saudi government cooperated fully, although not 
publically, with U.S. operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) by 
allowing U.S. forces to use Saudi air bases to control U.S. aircraft (not U.S. air strikes) in 
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Afghanistan.  Beginning in 2008, the Saudi government has engaged in the negotiations 
process between the Afghani government (lead by Hamid Karzai) and moderate Taliban 
leaders as a mediator in which they have strongly urged the Taliban leadership to seek 
reconciliation.177  
3.  Iraq (2003–present)  
The role of Saudi jihadist (or militants) in Iraq is significantly different and more 
complex than previous involvements in jihadi movements of the past.  Abd al-Muhsin al-
Ubaykan, a government-affiliated member of the Wahhabi ulama, issued a fatwa 
(religious opinion) “declaring that the insurgency in Iraq amounts to fitna (sedition) and 
is illegitimate.”178  This is most likely a reaction to the 2003 violence conducted by Al-
Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP).  The Saudi government realized the security risk 
that jihadi war veterans posed to its government.  The issue of Saudi participation was 
further complicated by the issuing of another fatwa in 2004, which stated that resisting 
U.S. occupation in Iraq was legitimate for the Iraq people.  This fatwa made the 
insurgency lawful in the understanding it was a collective duty; however, it was not 
necessary for Saudis to participate.  These conflicting and confusing fatwas issued by the 
government-affiliated ulama, not only confused the U.S. (a Saudi ally), but also Saudis 
themselves.179 
Despite these fatwas, Saudis began entering Iraq in March 2003, with record 
arrests and martyrs reported in the summer of 2003.  There was an influx that occurred in 
2004. With the QAP losing its battle in Saudi Arabia, many of the jihadist opted to go to 
Iraq instead. However, their numbers would be slowed that same year with the Saudis 
increasing their border security to prevent the traffic in both directions.  The actual 
number of Saudi participants, like in other jihadi conflicts, is highly disputed.  Thomas 
Hegghammer has noted the number to be around 421 individuals.  Although he claims  
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that his numbers are most likely incomplete, he does not assume there are more than 
1,500 Saudis participating in the Iraqi insurgency.  This is significantly less participation 
than has been seen by Saudis in other jihadi movements.180 
In terms of the Saudis that have participated, their motives can be divided, 
according to Hegghammer, into two groups: altruistic and personal.  Those altruistically 
motivated aligned with previous Saudi support for jihadi movements in that they are 
participating to liberate their fellow Muslims from U.S. occupation.  Those personally 
motivated align more with the radical and extremist ideologies in that they wish to reach 
heaven through martyrdom.  The majority of the Saudi participants seem less motivated 
by the idea of martyrdom.181  It is also difficult, like determining their motives, to 
determine the actual role the Saudi jihadists have actually played in the insurgency.  The 
Saudis have participated in the lower echelons of the insurgency and have been involved 
in a large number of the suicide attacks that have occurred through the insurgency.   
The size and importance of the Saudi involvement in Iraq has been most likely 
overestimated, and with the exception of some of the suicide attacks, have had little to do 
with the overall strategy of the insurgence.182  The change in the Saudi government’s 
policy towards jihadi movements seems to be more of a reaction to the QAP’s attacks 
(2003-2006) inside Saudi Arabia that threatened their domestic security than a proactive 
attempt to stem the tide of jihadi movements in the Muslim world. 
C. EDUCATION SYSTEM 
Since the mid 1970s, the Saudis have executed, with the assistance of the 
petrodollar, a campaign of spreading Wahhabism in the form of educational religious 
study in both madrasas (schools) and mosques throughout the Muslim world.  This 
campaign has drawn a great deal of scrutiny in the post-11 September world.  The 
majority of the assumptions and accusations stem from the idea that the Saudi suicide 
terrorist (hijackers) who participated in the September 11, 2001 attacks were 
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representatives of the Saudi educational system that promulgates messages of hatred 
towards non-Muslims and links to Al-Qaeda.183  It has been suggested in some studies 
that Wahhabi (or Saudi) domestic and abroad madrasas promote a religiously based 
curriculum intolerant of other religions and cultures.184  Other accusations have declared 
that the curriculum taught in madrasas and mosques has fostered extremist and radical 
thinking adopted by various terrorist groups.  In 2002, a Center for Strategy and 
International Studies (CSIS) report indicated that “some Saudi textbooks taught Islamic 
tolerance while others viciously condemned Jews and Christians...[and] use rhetoric that 
was little more than hate literature.”185  In 2005, Freedom House’s Center for Religious 
Freedom referred to the literature being distributed from Saudi madrasas and mosques 
amount to nothing less than “hate ideology.”186  “The system and its underlying ideology 
have been accused of contributing to anti-western sentiments and of providing fertile 
ground for Islamic extremism.”187  The Wahhabi educational system was designed to 
create a sense of loyalty, obedience and the duty of spreading and defending the Wahhabi 
message.188 
Education should 'promote a spirit of loyalty to Islamic law by denouncing 
any system or theory that conflicts with it and by behaving with honesty 
and in conformity with Islamic tenets'; it should 'awaken the spirit of 
Islamic struggle, fight our enemies, restore our rights, resume our glory 
and fulfill the mission of Islam' and 'project the unity of the Muslim 
nation.189 
1. Evolution of Wahhabi Education  
Traditional Wahhabi education evolved from the model of learning that occurred 
in medieval Muslim societies with the purpose of “transmitting the eternal truths about 
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God, His creation, man’s place in creation and so forth.”190  This was achieved through a 
deep familiarity with the Qur’an and Sunna as the primary sources of belief and conduct.  
A study of various languages was offered to ensure students would have a proper 
understanding of the primary sources and arithmetic was included to ensure students 
could calculate inheritances and zakat (alms) payments in accordance with shari’a 
(Islamic religious law).  The instruction of students initially took place in mosques, 
teacher’s homes or workshops.  In the twelfth century, madrasas were formed as 
institutions dedicated to study; however, it was not until after the eighteenth century that 
the majority of students would be trained in madrasas.  Students would be issued ijaza 
(permission) that qualified them to teach others what they had learned.191   
This was the educational system where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab received his 
instruction and the method that he employed to spread his teachings.192  The Wahhabis 
utilized the same standard sources with regard to teaching the subject of Arabic, sciences, 
arithmetic and Hanbali law, but when it came to theology, they used Ibd Abd al-
Wahhab’s Book of God and other sources that refuted the challenges made against 
Wahhabi teachings.  The Wahhabi ulama would maintain this method of teaching and 
content well into the twentieth century.  Modernization of the educational system did not 
occur until around 1920, when Ibn Saud decided it was necessary for Saudis to be 
educated in subjects that addressed other cultures, languages and modern sciences.  Hafiz 
Wahbah, head of the Directorate of Education, was able to overcome the Wahhabi 
ulama’s opposition, with the king’s support, allowing him to introduce these modern 
subjects into the current Wahhabi curriculum.193  The push for modernization would 
intensify with the discovery of oil and the formation of the state institutions in the 
modern era. 
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The oil industry, ARAMCO, and the state’s newly established governmental 
institutions, demanded that Saudis receive a broader and higher quality of education that 
would provide them the skills necessary to perform jobs in modern industry and 
government.  To obtain support from the Wahhabi ulama, which was necessary to fund 
the needed improvements, required that the new curriculum (examined in greater detail 
later in this section) still be dominated by religious study.  The purpose of the modern 
education system was to “achieve mass literacy, to create a uniform national system of 
schools, exams and textbooks and to incorporate science, foreign languages and social 
studies into the curriculum.”194   
In 1953, King Saud Ibn Abd al-Aziz ordered the education systems within the 
kingdom merged together under the central control of the Ministry of Education as a first 
step in meeting the goals of modernization set forth by his predecessor, King Saud.195  
By 1958, substantial allocations of the national budget were dedicated to the 
improvement of education and the spread of elementary education to the smaller 
provincial towns.  In 1957, higher education would be introduced into the educational 
system with the establishment of King Saud University (originally Riyadh University).  
The Wahhabi ulama established the Islamic University in Mecca in 1961, as an 
alternative to King Saud’s and other Arab universities secular curriculums.  The 1970s, 
with the introduction of the petrodollars from the oil boom, allowed for the building of 
hundreds of madrasas and the hiring of thousands of teachers, which resulted in over half 
the Saudi population becoming literate.196 
2. The Curriculum, Textbooks and Teaching Methods 
The content of the curriculum at all levels of the education system is dominated 
by religious study.  The main focus of this religious study is on the Qur’an, tawhid 
(declaration of oneness of God), tajwid (recitation), tafsir (interpretation of the Qur’an), 
hadith (record of the sayings and deeds of the Prophet) and fiqh (jurisprudence).  The 
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amount of time dedicate to the study of these religious subject varies depending on the 
level of education required to dedicate a percentage of their weekly school hours to the 
study of religion such as elementary school (30 percent), intermediate school (24 percent), 
secondary school (14–35 percent), secular universities (10–15 percent) and religious 
universities (40–45 percent).  Three of seven of the Saudi’s main universities are 
dedicated to religious studies.  All students are required in their first year of school to 
take an Islamic ideology course designed to fortify their beliefs in the Wahhabi belief 
system and renouncing of all other “godless ideologies.”197 
The goal of teaching history as part of the curriculum is to unify the population 
under a common Saudi identity.  The history taught ignores the histories of non-Najd, to 
include the histories of the Hijaz and the Shi’a.  It glorifies the exploits of Ibd Saud in 
unifying the tribes and country and returning all Muslim of the Arabian Peninsula to the 
orthopraxy of Islam, but eliminates any mention of the battles, massacres and bloodshed 
that accompanied this unification.  The history taught also glorifies the early Islamic 
Empires, but fails to address contemporary issues and events such as Nasserism, pan-
Arabism, revolutions in neighboring Muslim countries or even the Gulf War.198  
Wahhabism greatly influences the textbooks’ content and is strictly regulated by 
the Wahhabi ulama.  The sections dedicated to the teaching of other cultures, ideologies 
and religious is divided into two groups: believers (those that follow Wahhabism) and 
kuffar (unbelievers or those who do not follow Wahhabism).  The references to the 
“People of the Book” (i.e., Christian and Jews) is full of contradictions with one side 
claiming that peace and friendship should be extend, and on the other hand, declaring that 
jihad should be waged against them.  Further, there are contradictions concerning the 
practice of jihad and the concept of Islam as a religion of peace.  The belief systems of 
the Shi’a and Sufi were, until 1993, openly denounced in all textbooks as bid’a 
(innovation).  Textbooks also blame countries of unbelievers for encouraging bid’a and 
tarnishing religion; especially, accusing the Iranians for inciting unrest or rebellious 
attitudes in Saudi Shi’a.  This rhetoric against the Shi’a has been removed from official 
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textbooks, but is still present in books distributed by Saudi sponsored mosques both at 
home and aboard.199  The content of textbooks also teaches of Jewish and American 
conspiracies that claim they are attacking Islam.200  
The content and curriculum conveyed in the textbooks is reinforced by the 
methods use to teach it.  The rote learning method (a technique that avoids understanding 
of a subject and instead focuses on memorization) is employed in teaching religious 
subjects.201  “This philosophy of teaching inculcates passivity, dependence, an a priori 
respect for authority and an unquestioning attitude.” 202   This system limits 
student/teacher interactions, discourages the debating of curriculum subjects or current 
issues and limits creative or analytical thought as a means of learning.203  However, 
students are not just limited to the public schools as mediums for learning.  Students also 
are educated in their mosques, homes and by the media almost to an equal degree and 
referred to at times as the hidden curriculum.  This creates a divide between the education 
received by students in the public schools and those that receive this private education, 
which at times, can be more conservative.204  
3. Exporting the Curriculum 
Saudi Arabia is involved with the exportation of Wahhabism in the sphere of 
education in a number of ways, which includes “building and funding new mosques, 
Islamic cultural centers, schools and universities, as well as providing generous 
scholarships and assistance to perform the hajj.”205  There is also a great deal of influence 
spread through the distribution of Wahhabi versions of the Qur’an and other religious 
texts.  There are two main reasons related to power considerations for exporting Wahhabi 
teachings:  political and religious rivalry with Iran or other challenging Muslim countries 
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and to placate internal religious dissent.  This allowed the Saudi government to contain 
and control any domestic opposition by diverting their attentions to educating the 
unbelievers in other Muslim countries.206   
This policy of exportation did come with domestic and international consequences.  
On the domestic front, the returning Arab Afghans, educated in the Wahhabi system and 
sent to fight in the jihad in Afghanistan, began to return and view the Saudi government’s 
alliances with Western powers, particularly allowing U.S. troops to be stationed in Saudi 
Arabia during the Gulf War, as a reason to declare a jihad against the Saudi 
government.207  On the international front, the influx of Wahhabism into other countries 
often created friction and conflict with local officials and particular aspects of 
Wahhabism, in the form of neo-Wahhabism, have been adopted by extremist and radical 
groups that have engaged in local, regional and international terrorism.208        
4. Reforming the Curriculum  
The education system has been plagued with numerous problems such as “poorly 
trained teachers, low retention, lack of rigorous standards, weak scientific and technical 
instruction and excessive attention to religious subjects,” 209  which has amplified 
admissions to religious universities resulting in Saudi graduates that do not have the 
completive skills to compete in either the domestic or international job markets.210  
Although most Saudis recognize the need for education reform to improve their economic 
opportunities, they have chosen to defend their system of education against external 
criticism of the system supporting extremism.211  Reforms to the educational system are 
most likely to be met by strong opposition from the ulama and be extremely slow to be  
 
 
                                                 
206 Prokop, “Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Education,” 83. 
207 Ibid., 84. 
208 Ibid., 85. 
209 Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, 128. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Prokop, “Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Education,” 77. 
 63
enacted, if at all.  The ulama views changes to the curriculum as a sign of weakness by 
the Saudi government and their willingness to placate U.S. desires and would weaken 
Wahhabi influence abroad.212   
The resistance to change does have a positive aspect associated with it as “it may 
provide a starting point for a dialogue among various stakeholders that will be important 
not only in respect of curriculum development but also for the emergence and 
involvement of a more active civil society.”213  Then Crown Prince, now King Abdullah, 
has called the “events of 11 September as an opportunity for self-scrutiny.”214   
D. EXPORTING FINANCES 
In conjunction with support of jihadi movements and the exportation of Wahhabi 
education, the Saudis distributed funds throughout the Muslim world to support these 
efforts.  The majority of financial support was dispersed through two sources: Islamic 
charities (Saudi sponsored and private) and private Saudi donors.  The intended usage of 
these funds was to support the building of mosques and madrasas, Islamic centers and 
support humanitarian efforts; however, allegations of funds being diverted to extremist 
and radical terrorist groups arose in the wake of the 11 September attacks.  The 9/11 
Commission report released in July 2004 concluded the following: 
[N]o evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi 
officials individually funded [Al-Qaeda]…[however, that Saudi Arabia] 
was a place where Al-Qaeda raised money directly from individuals and 
through charities,” and indicates that “charities with significant Saudi 
government sponsorship.215 
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There have also been allegations originating from the U.S. Department of Treasury in 
July 2005, accusing the private Saudi donors of being a significant source of financial 
support for the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.216 
1. Islamic Charities and Charity Oversight 
Charitable (alms) giving is one of the five pillars of Islam and an obligation for all 
Muslims.  Contributions amongst Muslims may vary, but on average, Muslims donate 2.5 
percent of their annual income to mosques, charities, relief organizations to support 
various projects throughout the Muslim world.  The Saudi government estimated (in 
2004) that approximately 100 million dollars of charitable donations were directed to 
causes abroad. 217   The exact amount of these funds diverted to terrorist groups is 
currently in dispute.  However, an Indonesian Intelligence official has estimated that 15-
20 percent of the charitable donations have been diverted.218   
Zachary Abuza suggests, in Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial 
Network of Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, that groups like Al-Qaeda and Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), were able to divert these founds because they had placed operatives within 
the leadership of various Islamic charities in the late 1990s.219  He estimates that Saudi-
based charities have actually distributed over 10 billion dollars worldwide in support of 
their “Wahhabi-Islamist agenda” and that the Saudi government is either complicit or 
negligent.220 
Approximately over 300 private Islamic charities have established their base of 
operations in Saudi Arabia.  A Canadian intelligence report estimated that 1-2 million 
dollars were diverted to Al-Qaeda, whereas the U.S. National Security Council holds that 
300-500 million dollars have been diverted to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups from  
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Saudi charities.  Four major Saudi charities (Islamic International Relief Organization 
(IIRO), the Al Haramain Foundation, the Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MERC), 
and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)) have been suspected of diverting 
their funds to extremist or radical terrorist groups.221   
It is doubtful that the central leadership of many of these charities has set 
out to assist terrorists, but there is a surprising lack of knowledge of what 
their branch offices are doing on the ground, and paltry oversight of how 
their funds are actually being used and allocated.222 
The Saudi government, in response to considerable U.S. pressure, disbanded the Al 
Haramain Foundation after evidence of their association with Al-Qaeda, specifically one 
of their employees, of the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.223       
In 2002, the Saudi government announced it was establishing a government body, 
High Commission for Oversight of Charities, which would assume responsibility for 
reforming all Saudi-based Islamic charities.  In 2003, the Saudi government enacted new 
banking regulations that prohibited private charities and relief groups from distributing 
funds overseas; however, these regulations did not address multilateral Saudi-based 
charities such as the Muslim World League (MWL), the IIRO, or the WAMY.  In 2004, 
King Fadh established the Nongovernmental Commission on Relief and Charity Work 
Aboard, which would regulate all private charitable contributions earmarked for 
distribution to overseas locations. 224   As of 2007, none of the above-mentioned 
commissions had been established and the Saudi government claimed it was working 
through the remaining legal and financial obstacles standing in the way of the 
commissions being made operational.225 
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2. Unresolved Issues  
In addition to concerns related to funds being diverted from Islamic charities, 
there is also concern for donations made by private donors and currency controls.  Daniel 
Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, stated 
before the U.S. Senate committee on the Judiciary “while current regulations take 
account of the financial activities of charitable concerns, they do not apply to direct 
donations made by private donors.”226  No high profile or elite donors have been charged 
or prosecuted by Saudi Arabia, the U.S. or any other international judicial authority.  
Therefore, this source of potential funds to be diverted still remains unregulated. 
Even though new banking regulations have been enacted, loopholes still remain 
concerning currency conversations and cash couriers.  Saudi officials have been urged to 
require more information for all international currency transactions and to regulate 
currency being transported across their borders.  However, Saudi customs officials still 
do not use declaration forms, and therefore, have no mechanism of enforcement.  This 
lack of regulation of these private funds is a concern for the U.S. as reports have 
suggested that much of the funding for the Iraqi insurgency comes via these sources.227 
3. U.S. Assessment of Saudi Counterterrorist Financing Efforts 
In April 2008, Stuart Levey, Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence, made the following statements concerning Saudi Arabia’s effort 
towards combating terrorist financing. 
Saudi Arabia is serious about fighting Al-Qaeda in the kingdom, and they 
do, but that the seriousness of purpose with respect to the money going out 
of the kingdom is not as high…Saudi Arabia today remains the location 
from which more money is going to terror groups and the Taliban—Sunni 
terror groups and the Taliban—than from any other place in the world.228  
                                                 
226 Blanchard, “Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues,” 26. 
227 Ibid., 27. 
228 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Saudi Arabia: Backgrounder and U.S. Relations,” Congressional 
Research Service Report to Congress RL33533 (April 30, 2009): 9. 
 67
However, there has been a general concession among many U.S. agencies that the Saudis 
are taking the necessary steps to combat terrorist financing, but the process is moving 
slowly and there is still a considerable amount of work remains to be accomplished to 
make their system of regulation effective.  The U.S. State Department noted in the 2009 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report that Saudi Arabia still “continues to be a 
significant jurisdictional source for terrorist financing worldwide” and that they needed to 
do more to stem the flow of unregulated funds coming out of Saudi Arabia.229  The 
Saudis to date still have not made operational any of the commission mentioned above 
and their level of commitment to combating the flow of terrorist funds coming from 
Saudi sources still remains to be seen.   
E. MONOPOLY OF MEDIA SOURCES 
A major part of the Saudis campaign of exporting Wahhabism was the effort they 
extended to control all media sources and scholarship in the Muslim world.  Saudi Arabia 
established a complex worldwide system of financial incentives with the purpose of 
promoting governments and Muslim leaders to advocate Wahhabism or simply to refrain 
from any criticism of it.  The system also was in place to control the vast media sources 
such as television radio news and published religious fatwas, newspapers, academic 
papers and books.230  Saudi influence, both direct and indirect, was exerted through the 
largely Saudi-owned Arab media and publishing companies such as Al-Sharq, Al-Awsat, 
Al-Hayat, Al-Muslimun, Al-Majalla, the Middle East Boardcast Company and Orbit 
Satellite Television.231  Individuals also targeted were “writers and imams espousing pro-
Wahhabi positions would qualify for very lucrative contracts, grants and awards.”232  The 
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their book to ensure them a profit and entice them to take a pro-Wahhabi position.  This 
was most apparent in the 1980s and 1990s when known liberalist and rationalist authors 
published books praising and defending Ibd Abd al-Wahhab.233 
This control over the various sources of media in the Muslim world was made 
possible for two main reasons: 1) Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death also ended his effective 
anti-Saudi propaganda and 2) the influx of petrodollars in the late 1970s gave the Saudis 
the necessary capital to execute this campaign of media control.  This reason also 
contributed to the Saudis gaining political control of the Leagues of Arab states as well, 
opening up avenues into the various Arab countries media market with promises of 
financial aid.234   
The dominating control that the Saudis have had over Muslim media sources 
since the late 1970s may be ending.  The introduction of mass global communications, 
the Internet, independent news outlets (i.e., Al-Jazeera) and other mediums for 
disseminating massive amounts of information have opened the flood gates for 
uncensored and diverse information, opinions and debates to enter the Muslim world.235  
This has weakened the Saudi’s ability to suppress criticism of Wahhabism and the Saudi 
state and to influence the rest of the Muslim world.  The true impact of this 
communications revolution still remains to be seen and its impact on the Saudi people is 
still undetermined as the Saudi government still maintains control of the media, through 
censorship, inside Saudi Arabia.     
F. OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL-QAEDA 
The events of September 11, 2001 was the culmination or grand finale for a string 
of Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks that began with the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania in 1998, which was followed by the 2000 attack on the USS Cole (DDG 
67) in Aden Harbor in 2000.236  What made the attacks on September 11 different, other 
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than the severe loss of life and property, was that of the 19 suicide terrorists, 15 and the 
leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, who had claimed responsibility for the attacks, 
were all Saudi nationals.  These facts and questionable Saudi practices with regard to 
Islamic charities, support for jihadi movements and exportation of Wahhabism, lead U.S. 
politicians, citizens, academics, as well as others outside the U.S., to make the 
assumptions that Saudi Arabia must have be in some way involved in the attacks and 
with Al-Qaeda.  These assumptions have damaged the long-standing relationship that the 
U.S. has had with Saudi Arabia since the early 1930s.  Some experts even believe that bin 
Laden specifically chose Saudis to be the suicide terrorist to create such a divide between 
the two countries.237  “Osama bin Laden’s Saudi ties and support for Al-Qaeda among 
religious circles in the Kingdom created the impression that Wahhabism is a major factor 
in fomenting religious violence in many parts of the world.”238 
In 1980, the mujahidin forces fighting in the war opposing the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, supported primarily by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the U.S., pressured the 
Saudi royal family to send a leader for the contingent of Saudi fighters, mostly consisting 
of lower-class Saudis, political dissidents and militants.  Osama bin Laden would be 
selected as the commander of this contingent for three reasons: 1) No member of the 
royal family volunteered for the task, 2) Bin Laden at the time of his selection had close 
relationship with the royal family, and 3) Bin Laden’s making his considerable assets 
available ensured the Saudis would be well represented in the campaign.239  Bin Laden’s 
reputation amongst the Afghans, Arabs and fellow Muslims grew as he engaged in direct 
combat with the Soviets, demonstrating his commitment to the cause despite the fact that 
he was a member of the Saudi elite.  He also contributed to the campaign through 
building roads, medical centers, training camps and ammo depots.  With the Soviet defeat 
in 1989, Bin Laden and his fellow mujahidin fighters believe their victory was a sign 
from Allah (God) that their course was just and righteous.240  The victory left Bin Laden 
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with a sense of vindication and a belief that the struggle against similar enemies 
worldwide would be necessary “in order to establish a truly global community of the 
faithful.”241  In 1989, he would form Al-Qaeda as a means of continuing the jihad against 
the infidels outside of Afghanistan.242  Bin Laden decided to return to Saudi Arabia when 
Afghanistan began to fall into a state of civil war.  It is in Saudi Arabia where he would 
began to speak publically of the exploits of the Afghan jihad and encourage the 
boycotting of U.S. products.   
In 1990, when Saddam Husain’s forces invaded Kuwait, Bin Laden offered his 
services and his force of Afghan fighters to defend Saudi Arabia from possible invasion 
from Iraq.  The King, of course, refused such a request and instead invited the U.S. and it 
coalition partners into Saudi Arabia to defend its borders and conduct operations to 
remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  This decision by the King would enrage Bin Laden 
and he would align himself with other dissidents such as Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-
Awda.  His chief complaint was with the King’s decision to allow infidels into the 
Muslim holy land and with the Wahhabi ulama for supporting the King’s decisions.  He 
would declare the King apostate and call for his abdication.  He would challenge Abd al-
Aziz Ibn Baz, Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia (1993-1999), directly for supporting the 
King’s decision concerning the U.S. and negotiating for possible peace with Israel.243  
“He accused Ibn Baz of straying from Islam in order to please his masters, Al Saud.”244  
Bin Laden’s open dissent led him to relocate to Sudan in 1992, under the 
protection of the Islamic regime that came to power in 1989.  From his base in Sudan, he 
would continue his campaign of challenging Saudi Arabia and also of supporting the 
various jihadi movements occurring in Chechnya, Tajikistan, Bosnia and the 
Philippines.245  His continued criticism of Saudi Arabia resulted in the revocation of his 
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Saudi citizenship in 1994.246  In 1996, the Sudanese government, under pressure from the 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia, would expel him for his suspected involvement in the bombing of 
the National Guard barracks in Riyadh.  He would settle in Afghanistan, under the 
protection of the Taliban, and would issue is “Declaration of War against the Americans 
occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.”  In 1998, he issued a fatwa against the U.S., 
declaring that all Americans were complicit in the U.S. plans to destroy Islam, which 
would be followed by the string of attacks on U.S. targets culminating in the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.247   
1. Is Wahhabism the Ideology of Al-Qaeda? 
David Cummins believes that “the ideology of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda is 
not Wahhabi.”248   
It is instead a part of contemporary jihadist tendency that evolved from the 
teachings of Sayyid Qutb and took shape in the Egyptian militant groups 
that appeared in the 1970s and spread in the 1980s, thanks in large 
measure to the Afghan jihad.  In other words, al-Qaeda belongs to an 
offshoot of twentieth century Muslim revivalist ideology, not 
Wahhabism.249 
DeLong-Bas agrees with Commins’s assessment.  She would classify Al-Qaeda as a 
member of the Jihadist group; therefore, concluding that their ideology is an offshoot of 
Salafism, not Wahhabism, with their main focus of concern on the “exercise of jihad as 
military engagements in the defense of Muslims worldwide.”250  Muhammad Ayoob, on 
the other hand, concludes, “[it] is a marriage between Qutbist political ideas and the 
innate Puritanism and conservatism of the Wahhabi doctrine.”251  Ahmad Moussalli, 
supports the Ayoob definition with his conclusion that Al-Qaeda’s ideology is neo-
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Wahhabi/neo-Salafist.252  This argument concerning the origins of Al-Qaeda’s ideology 
continues to have opposing expert opinions from both sides.  Although the evidence does 
not definitively point to either side as being correct, the author believes that Wahhabism, 
through neo-Wahhabism, somewhat influence how it was developed.  Bin Laden’s Al-
Qaeda ideology would evolve more from his experiences in the Afghan jihad and his 
reaction to the Gulf War.     
G. CONCLUSION  
The Saudis embarked, with the aid of petrodollars, on a campaign in the late 
1970s to export Wahhabism as a means of establishing themselves a hegemonic force in 
the Muslim world mainly to complete with Iran and to fulfill the objective of defeating 
the Soviets in Afghanistan.  They created vast financial networks that supported various 
jihad movements throughout the Muslim world, built mosques, community centers and 
madrasas in other Muslim lands to spread their Wahhabi ideology through education and 
influenced Muslim governments and media sources through patronage to support their 
Wahhabi message.  Although it is impossible to conclude definitively based on the 
current information available of the extent of Saudi or Wahhabi involvement in the rise 
and spread of global terrorism, it can be concluded that whether intentional or 
unintentional, their campaign of exportation had one grave consequence.  Their campaign 
of spreading Wahhabism, more about promoting Saudi influence in the Muslim world 
then spreading Wahhabi ideology, created an environment that for approximately 30 
years, whether directly or indirectly, supported the spread of extremist ideologies and 
provided Bin Laden with the necessary resources and atmosphere to establish Al-Qaeda 
as the threat it has become today to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia alike.  Therefore, it was 
not Wahhabism that created this environment; it was Saudi government’s desire to spread 
their influence throughout the Muslim world in the form of financial, infrastructure and 
social incentives.       
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The tragic events of Al-Qaeda’s attacks against the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon led to a critical review by U.S. government policy makers, military leaders and 
academics of the part that Saudi Arabia might have played in the planning and execution 
of the attacks.  This thesis attempted to answer the question of whether or not Saudi 
Arabia’s religious ideology, Wahhabism, contributed to the rise and spread of global 
terrorism.  Through analysis conducted in this thesis, the overall conclusion is that 
Wahhabism was a contributing factor; however, it is not the only or main factor that 
contributed to the rise and spread of global terrorism. 
The Saudis can be held accountable for creating a permissive environment 
through their campaign of spreading Wahhabism that provided, whether intentional or not, 
groups like Al-Qaeda the opportunities to spread.  The Saudi campaign of financing 
charities, mosques, madrasas and Islamic centers throughout the world with no 
government regulation of the funds being contributed nor the manner in which they were 
distributed provided Al-Qaeda with a means of raising, laundering and distributing funds 
worldwide to support attacks against U.S., Saudi and other Western targets.  It is 
important to understand that the evidence concerning this theory is still more 
circumstantial than conclusive.  To date no members of any of the suspected charities 
leadership or any of the charities as a whole organization have been indicted on any 
charges related to terrorism in any court of the U.S., Saudi Arabia or International 
community.  Only one charity, the Al Haramain Foundation, was disbanded by the Saudi 
government with considerable pressure from the U.S. government.   
The evidence that the curriculum taught in the Saudi educational system within 
Saudi Arabia and exported to the mosques and madrasas worldwide promotes radicalism 
and extremism is also circumstantial and can be more conclusively proven to be 
intolerant.  Evidence can be presented that radical and extremist groups, specifically Al- 
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Qaeda, use these Wahhabi mosques and madrasas as places of recruitment; however, it is 
not clear if the curriculum taught alone or its combination with a multitude of other 
factors is what motivates the students to join these groups. 
It is true that Wahhabism is an ideology viewed by many as being intolerant of 
other religions and other Muslims’ interpretations of Islam, as backward or anti-
progressive with its stance against innovation and overly conservative or being literal in 
its interpretations of the Qur’an, Sunna and other religious texts.  However, intolerance 
does not always mean radical or extremist thinking.  The ideology practiced by Al-Qaeda 
is not strictly limited to Wahhabism.   
The ideology of al-Qaeda is not a simple affair, and it is a serious mistake 
to reduce it to Wahhabism. To do so is to ignore the extent to which al-
Qaeda broke with the traditional geo-political outlook of Wahhabism, 
which had never entered into politico-military opposition to the West and 
was indeed in alliance with the U.S. from 1945 onwards.253 
Al-Qaeda’s ideology is a mixture of neo-Wahhabi/neo-Salafi and radical Islamist 
ideologies influenced by the politics, economics and jihadi movements of the late 1970s 
and onward.  The melding of different ideologies, cultures and political views in the 
battlefields of Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq and other locations throughout the 
Muslim world, in conjunction with the failure of Muslim governments and Arab 
nationalists to deliver on promises made and the involvement of Western nations in the 
affairs of the Muslim world, have all contributed to the rise and spread of global terrorism.  
“Hypothesis two” underestimates to what extent the tenets of Wahhabism overlap with 
the extremist ideology of takfir, how intolerance can create fertile soil for which to 
demonize foreigners.  Little evidence was found to support “hypothesis three” and that 
individuals making those claims often base their arguments on the fallacy of guilt by 
association and no evidence despite their serious charges.  Therefore, the analysis of the 
evidence and the conclusions derived in this thesis best support “hypothesis one” that 
Wahhabism has provided passive support to the spread of global terrorism.   
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The Saudis have initiated programs with the intentions of reforming their 
educational curriculum and for regulating funds exported out of Saudi Arabia by both 
public and private charities and individual donors.  However, these programs or measures 
have either not yet been implemented or are slow to be implemented with little success in 
correcting the problems discovered.  The measure of Saudi commitment to combating 
global terrorism outside their own borders is still yet to be determined and is something 
that should be closely monitored and fostered by U.S. leaders, policy makers and 
diplomats in the near future. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The U.S. approach to combating global terrorism, specifically Al-Qaeda, and U.S. 
foreign policy toward the Muslim world, should take a two-pronged approach to 
addressing what cause radicalism that leads to terrorism.  The first approach should 
utilize elements of soft power: diplomatic, political and culture.  The second approach 
should utilize elements of hard power: military and economic intervention.  The 
utilization of soft power elements should be utilized prior to engaging any hard power 
elements to avoid creating additional issues and alienating possible allies by deploying 
military forces or crippling a state’s economy.254   
Both approaches should avoid essentialism, reductionism and generalizations.  
The Muslim world is a complex environment comprised of various countries and regions 
that employ different forms of government governing populations of diverse religious, 
ethnic and cultural identities.  The leaders and members of Al-Qaeda and other radical 
and extremist groups come from diverse and complex environments.  These strategies 
should be developed and employed to combat each group individually, as a policy 
designed to combat global terrorism as a whole, may prove to be effective against Al-
Qaeda, but at the same time, prove to be ineffective or detrimental to efforts to combat 
local or regional radical and extremist groups.255   
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These two strategies should address two main areas that have contributed to the 
radicalization of Muslims who then engage in terrorism.  The first area that should be 
addressed is the historic persistent political grievances that have developed in the Muslim 
world.  The failure of Arab nationalism and the authoritarian regimes to deliver on their 
promises has resulted in poor governance, repression and dishonor though military 
defeats.  Western support for these failed governments has also resulted in the rise of 
anti-Western and anti-American sentiments.  These failed governments also allow little to 
no legal participation in the government for the citizenry, and thus, leaving only radical 
activism or terrorism as a means of enacting political changes.  Through the use of soft 
power elements, the U.S. should attempt to influence these governments to implement 
democratic reforms that provide the citizenry with a legitimate means of expressing and 
correcting their grievances without resorting to violence.  The policy and strategy 
implemented should be careful not to utilize military or economic force against the 
citizenry to implement democratic changes.  These changes must develop over time and 
at a pace manageable by the country in which the changes are occurring.   
This leads directly into the second area that should be addressed, which are 
permissive environments.  These environments can be created by the states sponsoring or 
acquiescing to terrorist groups.  These types of permissive environments can be a result 
of the states not having the capacity to combat the rising radicalism within their own 
borders, which can be a direct result of their failure to implement a system of government 
that could properly address the citizenry’s grievances.  These environments can also be a 
result of the instability caused by rapid political change (i.e., regime changes).256   
The forcing of democratic changes can backfire, as it did in Iraq, causing the 
people to rise up not only against their government, but also against U.S. and Western 
forces that attempt to enforce the change.  A delicate balance of soft power elements and 
patience by the U.S. and Western powers dedicated to supporting those elements of the 
government and citizenry dedicated to democratic reforms could reduce the numbers of 
Muslims that resort to terrorism as a means of political change.  
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The use of hard power elements to protect U.S. national interests can at times do 
more harm than good demonstrated by the increased anti-Western and anti-American 
sentiments in the Muslim world in response to the U.S. led invasions and subsequent 
occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.  The implementation of hard power elements should 
be considered as a last resort option as they have historically done more to harm the 
citizenry than the oppressive governments themselves.  However, hard power elements 
may be required to remove an oppressive regime or as a last means to force an oppressive 
regime to enact reforms.  The U.S. should avoid acting unilaterally when implementing 
hard power elements by working more within the constructs of coalitions, multinational 
and United Nations forces that include Muslim allies and encourage those Muslim allies 
to participate in leading roles.  The use of other Muslim military forces to combat 
terrorism or enforce reform changes in other Muslim states might lessen the backlash 
against U.S. and Western states.  The limiting of the deployments or the permanent 
stationing of U.S. and Western forces in Muslim countries to the minimum allowable safe 
levels to accomplish missions by avoiding large scale deployments as a last resort, could 
also aid in reducing the spread of radicalism that leads to terrorism.   
These are not recommendations to remove U.S. or Western forces from Muslim 
countries to which they have been invited, nor for the U.S. or the West to employ military 
force when warranted.  It is more of a recommendation to use greater caution in the 
deployment of U.S. and Western military forces by employing a cost benefit analysis of 
the consequences of using hard power versus soft power elements.  The overall 
recommendations to U.S. policy makers, military leaders and academics is first to 
incorporate the lessons learned from past experiences in the Muslim world to determining 
whether a policy utilizing soft power or hard power elements can generate the least 
amount of consequences with the best possible results for both the Western and Muslim 
worlds.  Second, the task of reforming Wahhabism must be left up to Muslims, because 
the U.S. is in no position to affect these internal debates and intervention by the U.S. on 
religious doctrine can be construed as ‘U.S. efforts to falsify Islam’ and ‘turn Muslims 
from the true religion’.  
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